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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN LEGAL
EDUCATION AND LEGAL PRACTICE:
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PROFESSORS
AND PRACTITIONERS*
PANELISTS**
KRISTIN BEBELAAR is an Associate with Gulielmetti &
Gesmer, P.C., where she practices family law, real estate law,
and general civil litigation. Prior to law school, she was the
Children’s Program Coordinator at La Casa de las Madres, a San
Francisco shelter for battered women, and she later worked in a
special project of the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to
improve child sexual abuse investigations. She graduated from
Brooklyn Law School in 1996. After law school, she worked as a
staff attorney at the HIV Project of South Brooklyn Legal
Services, where she represented low-income, HIV-positive
clients in family, housing, health, discrimination and estate law
matters.
STACY CAPLOW is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School
and the Director of the Law School’s Clinical Education
Program. Since 1976, she has taught diverse clinics at Brooklyn
* This article is a transcription of a program held at Brooklyn Law
School on April 15, 2002. The event was sponsored and coordinated by
Brooklyn Law Students Against Domestic Violence (BLSADV), a feminist
student organization at Brooklyn Law School, to address the importance of
incorporating gender issues, including domestic violence, into law school
curriculum.
** Professor Chantal Thomas, Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law, participated in this program; her remarks are not reproduced
in this article.
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Law School, including a criminal defense clinic, an inmate
counseling clinic, a prosecutors clinic, and several externships. A
former staff attorney with the Legal Aid Society, she currently
teaches the Safe Harbor Clinic. She has taught Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure II for many years, as well as seminars and
classes in White Collar Crime and Federal Criminal Law. During
the 1980s, she was the Chief of the Criminal Court Bureau of the
Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, as well as their Director of
Training. She has also served as a Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Civil Division of the Eastern District of New
York. She recently taught the Prosecution Clinic at New York
University School of Law as an Adjunct Professor and is active
in various organizations relating to clinical legal education. Her
scholarship interests range from gender issues to portrayals of
women lawyers in popular culture.
PATRICIA FERSCH is the founder of the Family Law Center
in New York City. Law is her second career. She was previously
a retail buyer, merchandise manager and a wholesaler/
manufacturer in costume jewelry in the retail trade. She returned
to school for her undergraduate degree in 1983 for the purpose of
finding a new career that would enable her to help people. Her
new career goals were solidified in December 1990 after she saw
a 60 Minutes piece called Grandmothers at Law. She interned
with the organization in the summer of 1991 and decided to start
a similar practice in New York. She volunteered at the Legal Aid
Society when she started the Family Law Center as a low-fee
legal office serving the working poor in the five boroughs. She is
committed to serving individuals who are in need of legal
services but are unable to pay conventional attorneys’ fees.
Because of the importance of her internship experience, she
works with summer interns every year and has recently expanded
her practice by hiring one of her former interns as an associate.
BETTY LEVINSON is a Partner at Levinson & Kaplan, and her
primary practice areas are litigation and family law. She
graduated from Brooklyn Law School in 1973 and was admitted
to the Bar of the State of New York in April 1974. After two
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years as a criminal defense attorney at the Legal Aid Society in
New York County, she began working exclusively in private
practice. In addition to teaching and lecturing on gender, family
law, lesbian and gay, and domestic violence issues, she has been
counsel in a number of novel cases. In 1975, she was counsel for
amici in Bruno v. Codd, a successful challenge of the
mistreatment of battered women by the Family Court, Police
Department, and the Probation Department. In 1985, she
represented the defendant in People v. Green, described in her
article, Using Expert Testimony in the Grand Jury to Avoid a
Homicide Indictment for a Battered Women: Practical
Considerations for Defense Counsel, Women’s Rights Reporter
(Fall 1986). In 1992, she was co-counsel in Matter of Evan, New
York’s first lesbian adoption case. She also served as counsel for
the plaintiff in Nussbaum v. Steinberg, obtaining a ruling which
for the first time tolled New York’s one-year statute of
limitations for a civil assault action brought by a battered woman.
JENNIFER L. ROSATO is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School. Her area of interest focuses on ethical and legal issues
related to healthcare decisions made on behalf of children. Recent
articles on this subject have appeared in the Journal of Law,
Medicine and Ethics, Temple Law Review, and op-ed articles in
several newspapers across the country. She also writes in the area
of gender and the law and other family law. She frequently
lectures on family law issues and is active in a variety of bar
committees and organizations devoted to these issues. She served
as a Law Clerk to Judge Thomas O’Neill, Jr. of the U.S. District
Court of the Eastern Pennsylvania and was an Associate with the
firm of Hangley, Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman & Ewing.
After teaching at Villanova University School of Law, she joined
the Brooklyn Law School faculty in 1992.
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER is the Rose L. Hoffer Professor
of Law and Chair of the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest Law
Fellowship Program at Brooklyn Law School. She is author of
the prize-winning book Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking (Yale University Press 2000) and co-author of the
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law school casebook Battered Women and the Law (Foundation
Press 2001) with Clare Dalton, Professor at Northeastern
University Law School. A national expert on gender and law, she
has written numerous articles on civil rights, women’s rights and
civil procedure, and has lectured around the world on these
issues. She has also been a Visiting Professor at Harvard and
Columbia Law Schools. In June 2000, she was recognized by the
National Organization of Women–NYC with a “Women of
Power and Influence” Award. She has been active in legal
education reform, serving as a member of Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) Executive Committee and on the
Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers
(SALT). She joined the faculty of Brooklyn Law School in 1983,
after clerking for Judge Constance Baker Motley of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
serving as a staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional
Rights and a staff attorney with the Rutgers Law School–Newark
Constitutional Litigation Clinic.
ANTHONY J. SEBOK is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School, specializing in tort law and tort theory. He has authored
articles concerning handgun litigation, punitive damages, and the
differences between European and American tort systems, and
has lectured widely on American tort law. He has also published
Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (Cambridge
University Press 1999) and numerous law review articles on
jurisprudence, as well as co-edited the Philosophy of Law: A
Collection of Essays (Garland Publishing 1994). He was awarded
a Berlin Prize Fellowship by the American Academy of Berlin in
1999, enabling him to spend a semester abroad as a Visiting
Scholar at Humboldt University, where he began work on a
series of articles examining tort theory and punitive damages. He
returned to Berlin in 2001 as the DAAD Visiting Professor at the
Freie Universitat. Professor Sebok is also a regular columnist at
FindlLaw. He received his Ph.D. in politics and was Law Clerk
to Chief Judge Edward N. Cahn of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before joining the
faculty of Brooklyn Law School in 1992. His current research
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interests concern the way in which tort law is used to resolve and
remedy social problems.
LISA C. SMITH is Assistant Professor of Clinical Law at
Brooklyn Law School and is an expert in the area of domestic
violence. She served for many years as Executive Assistant
District Attorney for Domestic Violence, Sex Crimes and Child
Abuse in the King’s County District Attorney’s Office. She is a
member of the New York State Governor’s Advisory Council on
Domestic Violence and the Chairperson of the Brooklyn
Domestic Violence Fatality Review Team. She has initiated
several innovative programs to combat domestic violence that
have garnered national attention, lectures frequently on domestic
violence issues, and is often quoted in the media on this subject.
She has directed the Prosecutors Clinic at Brooklyn Law School
for more than a decade and recently broadened the clinic’s scope
to include federal misdemeanors in the Eastern District of New
York. Before joining the faculty at Brooklyn Law School in
1987, she served in the King’s County District Attorney’s Office
in the Narcotics Bureau, the Sex Crimes Bureau and as Deputy
Chief of the Criminal Court Bureau.
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INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon. My name is Candace Sady and I’m one of
the coordinators of this event from Brooklyn Law Students
Against Domestic Violence (BLSADV), a feminist student
organization here at Brooklyn Law School.1 We planned this
symposium to address the importance of incorporating gender
issues, including the issue of domestic violence, into the law
school curriculum.
The origin of this idea was a discussion during my Spring
2001 Battered Women and the Law class with Professor
Elizabeth Schneider. We were talking about domestic violence
through the lenses of sociology and psychology. A member of the
class said that law school should teach students to be lawyers, not
social workers or psychologists. She proceeded to say that she
had come to law school to become the former.
Basically, this comment made me think about the manner in
which a person who would not pre-select to learn about the issue
of domestic violence might respond when confronted with it in
practice. It made me consider how an attorney’s lack of
understanding or interest in a client’s needs, experiences or
background might affect that attorney’s perceptions, and how that
could negatively impact their legal practice.
Too often students graduate from law school without an
understanding of how domestic violence impacts the lives and
legal claims of their clients—without a clear understanding of the
link between theory and practice. This panel, consisting of law
professors who teach criminal law, torts, family law and
contracts, each paired with a practitioner practicing in that area,
will address this omission.
1

Candace Sady is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School, 2002, Oberlin
College, 1996, and is currently an Associate in the litigation and dispute
resolution department at Proskauer Rose LLP. She would like to thank
Professor Elizabeth Schneider for her assistance in organizing the symposium,
Jennifer L. Cohen-Vigder for her endless contributions to the event and the
Executive Board and all members of Brooklyn Law Students Against Domestic
Violence.
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I’d like to thank everyone in the audience for attending, and
the panelists for taking the time to prepare for this discussion. At
this time I’d like to introduce the moderator, Professor Elizabeth
Schneider.
DISCUSSION
Professor Elizabeth Schneider
First, I want to say how wonderful it is to have a panel like
this that was organized by the students in BLSADV. Thanks to
all of you and special thanks to Candace, who took tremendous
initiative in putting this program together. This is what you
dream about as a teacher, that issues come to the fore in your
classes and that students in those classes are so engaged that they
take the initiative to educate the legal community more broadly.
Today, we have an impressive group of speakers, both
colleagues on the Brooklyn Law School faculty and other law
schools, and a great group of practitioners. Our topic is legal
education and domestic violence—the need for integration of
issues of domestic violence more broadly into the law school
curriculum. Our focus is on criminal law, torts, contracts, and
family law.
This subject of domestic violence and legal education is very
close to my heart. I’ve been working for many years now with a
group of law teachers around the country on these issues and
with the American Bar Association Commission on Domestic
Violence. The ABA Commission has published important reports
on legal education and domestic violence and organized a series
of conferences around the country on legal education and
domestic violence.2 We now have specialized courses—what I
2

DEBORAH GOELMAN & ROBERTA VALENTE, A.B.A. COMM. ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO END
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT (1997) (describing the need to
integrate domestic violence issues into law school curricula in order to train
lawyers to better handle domestic violence issues), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/welcome.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003); A.B.A. COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEACH YOUR
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call “stand-alone courses”—courses on Battered Women and the
Law, that I teach here at Brooklyn Law School, and that I’ve
taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Florida State University Law
Schools. These specialized courses are taught at many law
schools around the country.3 But there are also law teachers
around the country who are integrating issues of domestic
violence into their mainstream law school courses. And of course
there are also specialized advocacy programs on domestic
violence, clinics on domestic violence, and other upper-level
courses that integrate these issues.
Almost every course in law school could and should integrate
these issues—first-year courses, clinics, specialized courses like
health law, family law, or poverty law, international human
rights, and employment law. If you look at the casebook on
domestic violence that Clare Dalton and I have written, you’ll get
a sense of the range of different issues and courses which are
affected.4
We have a critical responsibility here in the law school to
train lawyers. As many of you probably know, there are far too
few lawyers to assist battered women on the many issues for
which they need representation.5 Even lawyers who practice in
STUDENTS WELL: INCORPORATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTO THE LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT (forthcoming 2003).
3
For a comprehensive review, see generally A.B.A. COMM. ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEACH YOUR STUDENTS WELL, supra note 2
(examining efforts by law schools nationwide to incorporate domestic violence
into law school curricula).
4
CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
THE LAW (Foundation Press 2001) [hereinafter DALTON & SCHNEIDER]
(examining domestic violence in relation to family law, criminal law, civil
protection orders, tort liability, civil rights, employment law, insurance law,
immigration and asylum law, and international human rights).
5
See id. at 339-49, 1062-92 (discussing legal representation in domestic
violence cases). See also Justice Suarez, Decision of Interest, N.Y. L.J. (Feb.
11, 2003) at 18 (emphasizing that inadequate compensation has produced an
insufficient number of panel attorneys resulting in the denial of counsel to
family court litigants, and the courts are forced to proceed, on a regular basis,
without attorneys in domestic violence, foster care placement and review,
child protective and juvenile delinquency proceedings).
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the field of family law do not have knowledge or experience with
intimate violence so that they can even recognize when they have
a case that involves these issues.6 Issues involving domestic
violence can arise in almost every area of practice. So we have a
tremendous obligation to educate ourselves and younger lawyers
about issues of domestic violence.
I want to give special thanks both to my colleagues on the
faculty of Brooklyn Law School who will be speaking today:
Stacy Caplow, Lisa Smith, Tony Sebok, Jennifer Rosato, and to
others who are not speaking, who have been terrifically
supportive and enthusiastic about this curricular work. And I
want to thank other colleagues, such as Chantal Thomas from
Fordham Law School7 and Betty Levinson from Levinson &
Kaplan, who are participating in this program.
It is also particularly special to have Kristin Bebelaar with us
today. Kristin, now a lawyer in practice with Gulielmetti &
Gesmer, who previously worked at South Brooklyn Legal
Services, is a Brooklyn alum who worked closely with me as a
research and teaching assistant when I was beginning to teach
Battered Women and the Law and write these books. I know that
as a lawyer she is now making a huge difference in the lives of
many battered women. She’s an example to me of the enormous
impact that learning about domestic violence as a law student can
make to legal practice.
We will now begin the program.
We start with criminal law, with Stacy Caplow, who teaches
criminal law here as the professor. Lisa Smith, although she is
both professor and practitioner in the Prosecutor’s Clinic here,
will be speaking from the practitioner perspective. Then, we will
go to torts with Tony Sebok, who teaches torts here, as the
professor and with Betty Levinson from the practitioner’s
perspective. Then, we will move to contracts with Chantal
Thomas talking from the contracts professor’s perspective, and
Kristin Bebelaar from the contracts practitioner’s perspective.
6

DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 806-79 (examining domestic
violence and the law of torts).
7
The remarks of Professor Chantal Thomas are not reproduced in this
publication.
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And then finally family law, with Jennifer Rosato who teaches
family law here, speaking from the perspective of the professor,
and Pat Fersch from the perspective of the practitioner. We’ll
then open it up to all of you for questions, comments and
discussion.
Professor Stacy Caplow
I enter this conversation with a disclaimer: I do not hold
myself out to be a model for teaching or incorporating domestic
violence into first-year criminal law classes. To say otherwise
would be false advertising in front of the many people present
today who were students in that class. On the other hand, I make
a determined effort to deal with these issues as a distinct part of
the curriculum. I probably represent a fairly typical example of
the difficulties that arise when people with good intentions try to
integrate this subject into a basic first-year course. In addition,
having taught criminal law for many years, I also appreciate how
the topic of domestic violence has metamorphosed over this time
period with this course and how it has seeped into other classes.8
Criminal law seems like an obvious place to begin this
discussion. It is the course where issues of domestic or intimate
violence recur in so many of the cases read, even without
8

Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Martha
Albertson Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM.
L.Q. 211, 215 (2002) (explaining that domestic violence is no longer
considered strictly a criminal law concern). The treatment of domestic abuse
in areas like tort law changed dramatically in the past decade. Id. In addition,
because of feminists and women’s rights advocates, laws were changed and
policies and programs developed to address the dilemmas of women often
referred to as battered. Id. This evolution is also present in practice, outside of
the academic realm. See, e.g., M. Mercedes Fort, A New Tort: Domestic
Violence Gets the Status It Deserves In Jewitt v. Jewitt, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J.
355, 372 (1997) (explaining that a major change in domestic violence laws is
the ability of plaintiffs to recover for damages from an abusive relationship
under the theory of a new tort of domestic violence/battered women’s
syndrome); Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a
Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 325, 341-43 (1999) (describing the extension of domestic
violence protection to same-sex couples).
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necessarily being labeled as such. You do not need a casebook
that is called “Domestic Violence and the Law” to read about
forcible rape, abuse and neglect of children, or to encounter
cases involving battered women raising justification defenses, or
to study cases involving provocation or extreme emotional
disturbance defenses in which male defendants essentially claim
“she drove me crazy so I killed her.” These are a few of the
innumerable topics in criminal law where sex and violence are
linked.
Before I begin my brief remarks, I want to acknowledge
someone in the audience who was one of the first people to bring
to light the lack of coverage of domestic violence and other
gendered topics in the criminal law course particularly. Nancy
Erickson, who now works for Legal Services of New York here
in Brooklyn, taught family law for many years at Ohio State and
at New York Law School, and as a law teacher really was the
first person to ask the questions, “What are we teaching about
domestic violence?” and “What are we teaching about sex bias in
criminal law?” Nancy published two articles in 1990 examining
sex bias issues in criminal law courses and did a survey of
criminal law professors concerning what they teach about these
issues.9
There has always been an obvious relationship between
intimate and family violence and criminal law, so it should be
inevitable that these topics pervade that course.10 Yet more than
ten years ago Nancy looked at the standard criminal law
casebooks, and found them seriously lacking in any kind of indepth coverage of these topics; some were even devoid of any

9

Nancy S. Erickson (with the assistance of Nadine Taub), Final Report:
“Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law”, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990)
[hereinafter Erickson, Final Report]; Nancy S. Erickson & Mary Ann
Lamanna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course, A Survey of Criminal
Law Professors, 24 MICH. J. L. REFORM 189 (1990) [hereinafter Erickson &
Lamanna, Sex-Bias].
10
See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence,
75 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1987) (discussing the intersection between privacy law,
in both civil and criminal contexts, and family violence).
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coverage.11 She also reported the paucity of attention paid by
faculty to these topics.12
Taking a leaf from her work and thinking that this was a good
way to begin my remarks, I re-read her articles and then looked
at the most recent editions of six casebooks in my office, one of
which I now use,13 and two others which are familiar to me.14
The remainder were books I had never examined closely
before.15
Progress over the past decade has been mixed. These newer
editions contain more topics, expand familiar topics, and
generally give at least lip service to the notion that domestic and
intimate violence issues present complicated questions that
deserve a distinct place in the study of criminal law. With the
exception of the clearly recognizable issues of battered woman’s
syndrome and rape, most texts often include cases involving
domestic and intimate violence simply to illustrate broader
doctrines without acknowledging the underlying concerns that

11

Erickson, Final Report, supra note 9, at 316-17, 327-28 (noting that
despite growing interests regarding topics that concern women such as marital
violence and property distribution, “traditional casebooks has been evidenced
by the failure to include, or by superficial coverage, of [such] topics . . . in
the criminal law course”).
12
Id. at 223, 242-43. The study revealed that the topics least likely to be
covered in a criminal law class were the common law doctrine of coverture,
spousal-conspiracy doctrine, and issues of sexual harassment. Id. at 223. Some
of the many reasons cited by professors for not teaching these topics were the
belief that the doctrines were no longer relevant, lack of casebook coverage,
the thought that such topics were more relevant to other courses, and the
perceived unimportance of the subject matter compared to others in criminal
law. Id. at 213, 223-24.
13
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed.
1999).
14
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed.
2000); SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (7th ed.
2001).
15
RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW (1997); GEORGE E. DIX &
M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed.
2002); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS
(1994).
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prompt the crime.16
Several basic topics are included in all of the books, with
varying degrees of thoroughness. Some books have expanded
their coverage noticeably since their earlier editions. Predictably,
in every book there are materials about the battered woman’s
syndrome defense that address issues that are far more
complicated and treat developments over the past decade with a
fair amount of depth.17 This is not surprising since this particular
topic has been one of the leading gendered issues in criminal
law—along with rape—for a long time.18 Equally unsurprising, in
16

Cf. BONNIE, supra note 15, at 792 (citing People v. Casassa, 49
N.Y.2d 668 (1980)). Casassa involved a man who killed the woman with
whom he was in love simply because she did not love him in return; it is
included in the section discussing when provocation can be used to reduce
murder charges to manslaughter. Id. See also KADISH, supra note 15 at 197
(citing Kuniz v. Montana, 995 P.2d 951 (Mont. 2000)). In Kuniz, the
defendant stabbed her live-in boyfriend with a knife after he became physically
abusive towards her. Id. Kadish includes the case in the section discussing
what constitutes culpable conduct and, specifically, whether the defendant had
a duty to seek medical assistance for the victim in light of the fact that she
caused the situation.
17
Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 486-506; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note
14, at 581-610, 763-75; BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 360-74; DIX ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 786-801; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 751-67.
Almost all of the books feature the same two cases: State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) (noting that whether expert testimony on battered
woman’s syndrome is admissible evidence depends on whether it is relevant to
the defendant’s claim of self-defense; however, the use of force in self-defense
is only justifiable when “the actor reasonably believes that such force is
immediately necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily
harm,” therefore, the expert must testify carefully so as not to determine
whether the defendant’s fears and actions were reasonable since that is a
question only the jury is permitted to answer) and State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (disagreeing with the idea that evidence of battered
woman’s syndrome is sufficient, without more, to justify killing as perfect self
defense, and therefore, the defendant, who was continuously abused by her
husband, was not entitled to a charge of perfect self defense since her husband
was sleeping when she shot him and there was no justifiable fear of imminent
bodily harm). The differences appear in the discussion in the notes following
the lead case.
18
Cf. Albert R. Roberts, The Criminal Justice System Can Reduce
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every casebook there is an extensive chapter on rape and sexual
violence offenses, all of which have expanded demonstrably over
the past decade.19
Rape and battered woman syndrome are obvious subjects that
could trigger class discussion about the underlying social and
psychological issues of domestic violence as well as enforcement
policies. Probably most criminal law teachers engage in some
form of historical or sociological conversations in their courses.
However, there are other less obvious topics which should not be
ignored but are often sacrificed in the name of doctrinal analysis.
For example, in every book, there are some cases relating to the
reasonableness standard in either or both the self-defense and
provocation sections in which gender differences arise.20 Often
the cases in these sections are factually based on violence against
women, wives, girlfriends or objects of male fantasy. Some, but
certainly not all, of the casebooks have attempted to go beyond
the usual questions related to the heat of passion doctrine such as
“Are mere words sufficient?” and have added note material about
the reasonableness standards based on gender.21 Domestic and/or
Violence Against Women, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (James D. Torr
ed., Greenhaven Press 1999) (explaining that in the last two decades all fifty
states have passed criminal statutes to protect battered women and that
prosecution of spousal abuse as well as rape cases has steadily increased);
KADISH ET AL., supra note 14, at 313 (noting that few areas of criminal law
have attracted as much controversy and attention as rape over the past two
decades); STANLEY G. FRENCH ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (1998) (discussing that a woman is more
likely to be battered than raped and acknowledging long standing debate of
battered woman’s syndrome as an imperfect defense) [hereinafter VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN].
19
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 353-434; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 14,
at 313-86, 1077-160; BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 268-322; DIX ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 571-613; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 381-458.
20
Cf. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 354 (noting that the
reasonableness standard is an objective standard, thus, “jurors must decide
whether the defendant’s beliefs would be held by a reasonable person in the
defendant’s ‘situation.’”).
21
Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 238-63; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note
14, at 385-415 (including several key cases involving violence by man against
woman); KADISH ET AL., supra note 14, at 405-25 (highlighting cases
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intimate violence is at the heart of the facts of most of these
cases, but they are studied to illustrate traditional doctrinal
issues, and follow-up notes rarely raise more complicated
questions of gender or sex-bias. Other examples of a category of
cases that offer opportunities to consider domestic and intimate
violence are those dealing with omissions in the criminal act—or
actus reus—section, or relating to the standard of negligence in
unintentional killings, or causation. In almost all of these cases,
the death of a child results in a caregiver or parent being charged
with some form of either negligent homicide or assault for either
directly harming, or failing to prevent harm to the child.22 Yet,
aside from their very disturbing facts describing violence towards
children, these cases are rarely used to spark any discussion
beyond straightforward doctrinal analysis.
I did note some new topics in the more recently published
texts. A few books acknowledged the so-called “cultural
defenses,” which often pose sex-linked issues about how men and
women behave under certain circumstances when they import
cultural norms and behavior to the United States and then find
themselves criminally accountable.23 Sometimes, but not always,
the charges involve what Americans would consider domestic or
involving killing by jealous male partner); BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at
776-801 (illustrating Model Penal Code approach, citing People v. Casassa,
404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980) (involving a rejected suitor)); DIX ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 473-94 (including a case where the defendant and victim
were “romantically involved”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 14, at 284-304
(including a case involving the killing of a “paramour”).
22
DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 277-80 (citing People v. Williams, 484
P.2d 1167 (Wash. 1971) (convicting parents of manslaughter for failing to
obtain medical treatment for their child)), 196-200 (citing Oxendine v. State,
528 A.2d 870 (Del. 1987) (involving brutal child abuse in context of
causation-in-fact)); KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 472-75 (citing State v.
Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding parents liable for
failing to provide medical attention to baby when a man of reasonable
prudence would have done so under similar circumstances)). See also KADISH
ET AL., supra note 14, at 431-33.
23
See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 419 n.6, 683-94; KAPLAN ET
AL., supra note 14, at 415-26 (noting the relevance of cultural norms on
mother’s killing of child), 599 n.11 (noting the various battering and cultural
defenses).
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family violence or abuse.
There are also limited references to extending the battered
spouse defense to include other victims of violence, notably
children.24 There was only one book that had a separate section
on any kind of feminist legal theory.25 Every so often, there
might be a snippet from something written by some notable and
recognizable feminist scholars such as Liz Schneider, Susan
Estrich or Nancy Erickson. However, other than those occasional
excerpts tucked into the notes in the chapters on rape or the
battered spouse defense, there is very little overarching theory at
all.
Why are casebooks important? As Nancy realized years ago,
they basically structure what is taught in the course.26 In her
survey, Nancy asked many criminal law teachers why a certain
subject was not covered. The most common response was
“Because it is not in the textbook.”27 Therefore, if something is
not in the book, chances are teachers will be restricted by those
editorial—and possibly ideological—choices, unless they have the
energy and the creativity to supplement the materials.
Casebooks do not just limit the subjects taught; they flag
certain perspectives based on which cases are chosen and how
those particular cases are edited. By the language used, cases
reveal what the judge is thinking about the particular facts of the
case. However, to impressionable first-year students, in
particular, who tend to accept uncritically the perspective
presented in the case, the cases shape the very way in which the
issues are internalized. Even the teacher who is willing and
24

See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 505-06 n.5 (discussing the use
of battered woman syndrome as a defense for the domestic partner who
participated in a crime spree because she felt compelled to); KADISH ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 775 (stating, “[m]any courts that permit the use of battered
woman’s syndrome to support a claim of self-defense accept similar evidence
in cases involving a battered or abused child who kills the abusive parent”);
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 374 n.4 (discussing the analogy between the
battered wife syndrome and the battered child syndrome as defenses for
murder).
25
SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 90-96.
26
Erickson & Lamanna, Sex-Bias, supra note 9, at 311.
27
Id. at app. A.
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desirous of incorporating more materials faces the limitations
posed by case selection and editing. It is worth observing,
however, that case selection particularly in the chapters or
sections on rape and the battered woman’s syndrome defense
were practically identical in all of the books I examined. There
are only a finite number of cases that raise the central issues
effectively.
We have been asked to talk about our concerns and
inhibitions about raising domestic violence topics in a course not
expressly dedicated to those issues and that purports to examine
the law “objectively.” Probably anything I could say about this
would be true for any course with the possible exception of
Women and the Law. Principally, there is the coverage tension,
the challenge all of us face in every course to finish the materials.
Because issues concerning domestic violence are so rich and so
controversial, emphasis on them may exacerbate the coverage
dilemma. Students will want to talk about them in class and no
instructor would want to cut off discussion. Having raised
provocative questions, it would be unfair to say, “Okay, that was
our five minutes on that hot topic.” You want to see the
conversation develop, yet whenever you dedicate a lot of time to
one issue you detract from others. Therefore, these choices
present their own controversies given the expectations of the
students about the course coverage and approach.
Another characteristic of criminal law that is less true about
other courses is that the course is loaded with emotional land
mines throughout the semester. You never know when there is
somebody in the class for whom a case resonates, who has had a
personal experience or similar event in their lives, whether
directly as a crime victim, or whether they identify with either
the victim or the defendant in some way. These are very touchy
issues and can be flashpoints during class discussions. I am sure
all of us teaching criminal law or family law have had students
come up to us to say, “I’m not participating in this
discussion . . . I hope you’ll understand.” They will describe
something that happened to them, or to a relative or friend, that
makes them uncomfortable about participating, or perhaps even
attending class.
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In addition to the land mines, there are also considerable
gendered reactions to many criminal law issues. The criminal law
course offers myriad opportunities for very exciting and lively,
but often uncomfortable, debates about rape and other issues that
reveal the differences between the women and men in the class
concerning certain values and conduct. These topics create class
divisions at the outset, and, for the instructor, it is very hard to
steer tactfully and diplomatically through the class’s turbulent
discussion. Moreover, it is difficult to remain objective about
many of these subjects in front of the room. It is particularly hard
to refrain from either discrediting or sanctioning certain deeply
held points of view. Ideology and partisanship always create a
risk of alienating a portion of the students. Because the semester
will outlast any single class or discussion, there may be a big
price to pay for taking sides or even appearing biased. This is
especially true for a woman professor whom the students
undoubtedly assume has a “female” perspective on sex crimes
and gender related issues.
In my first-year class, the anxiety students already feel about
speaking out is compounded by the nature of the subject matter.
Some students are silenced by the sad and violent facts of the
cases and their emotional content, while others are emboldened to
speak out about their beliefs even though their comments have a
tenor that departs from typical classroom atmosphere. Either
way, they often speak or fail to speak for reasons largely related
to emotions or feelings. This compounds the stress of the class.
Not only are students concerned about whether they understand
the material, they also worry about how they are reacting to it
emotionally, and how their classmates are reacting to them.
Moreover, during their first-year adjustment period, they
generally struggle with the basic question of whether and to what
degree their personal beliefs, past histories and feelings can and
should play a role in their legal studies. As they try to learn to
“think like a lawyer,” they often overcompensate by being too
objective and neutral. In a criminal law class, this suppression of
genuine feelings and beliefs contributes to the self-doubt
experienced by many first-year students during their first
semester.
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Whatever divisions result from students’ experiences, their
politics, or their beliefs, those differences intensify during
discussions like this, and it is very hard to steer a steady course
without jeopardizing the good will of some, if not many students,
both on that day and in the future. In addition, I am not
convinced—and here I speak from my own experience—that all
teachers have the same ability to navigate these issues without a
shipwreck. I certainly do not hold myself out as an expert on
domestic violence, and I know that I cannot teach these topics as
skillfully as somebody who knows more than I do. Although I do
claim a degree of sensitivity and self-awareness that perhaps not
all criminal law teachers possess, I still do not feel confident
about my ability to handle these volatile subjects. I have
convinced myself that sincerity and tact will save the day.
Perhaps that is wishful thinking.28
It is hard to be all things to all people. It is especially hard to
be all things to all students. They microscopically examine
everything we say, reading meaning into remarks when none is
intended, and are quick to find fault. As any of us who have read
student course evaluations know, they are full of inconsistencies:
either you let them talk too much or you cut them off too soon;
you let some students dominate and other people feel put upon or
ignored. All of these difficulties are just exacerbated in the
context of these provocative topics.
Usually, criminal law is a required course and students cannot
28

For example, on an anonymous evaluation form, one student recently
criticized me for being tactless during our discussion of rape because I asked
the class to tell me about personal experiences before the whole class and
when no one did, assuming that no one had any experiences, I questioned
women about how they would react. This comment dramatized for me just
how tricky these discussions can be since this description is radically different
from what I believe occurred. I actually have a script that I use in the
beginning of this section every year which specifically tells the students that
they do not have to talk about personal experiences, that they have to treat this
subject and others’ viewpoints with respect, and that they have to appreciate
that some students may have had personal experiences that inform their
opinions. Despite this admonition, this student apparently heard something
completely different from what I said, probably because of his or her own
expectations and discomfort.

DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC

428

7/7/03 11:06 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

pick their professor. Teaching about domestic violence in this
setting, then, poses the problem that the student is participating in
something without having chosen it. For some students—of
course—this emphasis is perfectly acceptable, but for others it
could be objectionable or—if not objectionable—at least they
question what this emphasis is costing in the coverage of other
topics: “Are we missing something if we spend so much time on
this?”
I have a few thoughts about how I might try to improve my
own class. One is to try to unlink domestic violence issues from
gender identification. If perceived as a woman’s issue, male
students—many of whom already feel alienated from the topic or
intimidated about speaking out by the strength of many women’s
views—will further shut down. Consistent with this, I would
prefer a more integrationist approach. In other words, instead of
labeling an issue “domestic violence,” identify how the case is
really about domestic violence disguised as a more neutral
doctrinal voice.
I also think at the same time I would re-link domestic
violence to more universal issues that come up in criminal law—
link sex and violence more directly to seemingly objective
doctrines like reasonableness. Many of the texts provide some
tools for achieving this. Link the causes of domestic violence and
its emotional roots to issues that we all question in criminal law,
at least from time to time, about where and how emotion and
passion matter. The many ways in which men and women engage
in intimate violence provide vivid and depressing examples of the
kind of human behavior that the criminal law addresses. By using
domestic violence as an example rather than a focal point, a more
successful conversation might ensue.
Also, I think when we examine court decisions we should
prod students to consider what is omitted from the text. When,
instead of just saying “Miss So-and-So is the mother of a sevenyear-old child,” the judge writes, “Miss So-and-So is the mother
of an illegitimate seven-year-old child”—a fact that has nothing to
do with the case—we should ask what this signals about the
resulting outcome. This kind of blatant editorializing within a
judicial decision is something that we all think about
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occasionally.29 Why not think about it even more, bring it up in
other topics in relation to all of the cases we read, and to
consider how the people and the parties in the cases are being
portrayed and the assumptions these portrayals produce?
Another suggestion is to encourage students to create their
own stories about what is missing from the facts of a case. For
example, there is a one-paragraph case in the Dressler casebook
called Martin v. State, in which a man is dragged out of his
house by the police and charged with public intoxication. 30 The
question is whether he committed a voluntary act. The class can
have a nice conversation about voluntariness, and it is a good
case for using a conventional Socratic technique. But we read it
in the beginning of the semester, so I often ask my students,
“What’s going on here? Why were the cops even at the house?
Was there something else happening besides this man being
drunk and pulled out of the house?” I ask them to write a more
detailed statement of facts. Many students come up with a
domestic violence story, “He was drunk, and was being abusive
to his wife. A neighbor called the police.” Sometimes you can
see how domestic violence is the hidden text of many seemingly
more neutral stories.
In terms of techniques, if students tell stories, particularly if
they experiment with role reversal a little more, they may be able
to see how stereotypes determine our thinking. Even more
importantly, I think we ought to take a chance on bringing more
of the world back into the classroom—something I try to do in
many ways including in the context of domestic violence. Read
newspaper articles and relate them to cases in the text so that the
29

This is not to suggest that all judges are biased or derisive in domestic
violence cases, although the potential ought to be noted. Cf. Joan S. Meier,
Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1295, 1353 (1993) (stating that “judges in family court frequently
express disrespectful attitudes towards the parties and the cases.”). In fact, the
situation in the District of Columbia was so severe that an incoming presiding
judge of the family division of the local courts suggested that training for the
bench include psychological consultation so judges could separate their
personal views from their professional duties. Id. at 1353 n.176.
30
17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1947).
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issues introduced by cases in the book feel more contemporary
and real. Have guest speakers. Go to court and see what is
happening in the real world. Nothing in the classroom will
resemble what is going on in family or criminal court and the
real stories of the people caught up in these systems. I encourage
people to do more of that in their regular classrooms.
All professors are role models in some way. What students
learn, how they learn it, and what is emphasized in law school
will follow them into the real world, and factor into the choices
they make in practice. We have to acknowledge the responsibility
of shaping the consciousness of our students. To the extent that
we have a commitment to exposing this particular topic—and take
care to include it more in our courses—we will leave a legacy.
Professor Lisa Smith
I’m Professor Lisa Smith, and I teach a variety of the
criminal clinical programs here at Brooklyn Law School. I’ve
been asked to speak as a practitioner, and I just want to say that
anything I speak about as a practitioner, the clinical students here
at the law school have all worked in exactly the same capacity.
So I’m speaking as a practitioner and also as a clinical professor.
The first question is how does domestic violence affect
criminal practice? I’m going to speak about that from three
perspectives: the prosecution perspective; the defense
perspective; and then quickly about the policy and planning
perspective.
From the prosecution perspective, the impact is so dramatic
that it’s really hard to describe. So I’m just going to tell you a
little bit about statistics for one moment to give you a sense of
impact.
Some of the changes that have occurred over the last few
years, and the reason that we’ve had this tremendous impact
change can be attributed to one thing, which is the mandatory
arrest law in New York State.31 Most of you are aware of that
31

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 2003). New York’s
mandatory arrest law requires, generally, that a police officer perform a
mandatory arrest when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a
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fact, but mandatory arrest also applies in domestic violence
situations32 and this has increased the number of arrests
dramatically.33 Additionally, and I think probably more
importantly, a lot of the work done by people like Professor
Schneider and many of you in the audience has brought much
attention to domestic violence and increased awareness and the
number of arrests.34 These are obviously some of the reasons
person has committed a crime against a member of the same family or
household, or has an order of protection in effect. Id. It also addresses arrest
without a warrant by police officer, when and where it is authorized. Id.
32
This practice has been met with varying sentiments. Compare Alison
B. Veerland, The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Sparing
the Child or Spoiling the Family?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1060-61
(2000) (asserting that the mandatory arrest law has given endangered women a
reliable source of assistance because the police no longer ask the woman
whether or not she wants to press charges before arresting the alleged abuser),
with Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 PACE L.
REV. 97, 105-06 (1995) (stating that the mandatory arrest law brings an influx
of arrests into the criminal justice system, many of which prosecutors fail to
aggressively prosecute, resulting in charges being dropped and, consequently,
less incentive for officers to arrest in domestic violence situations).
33
See ADRIANA FERNANDEZ-LANIER ET AL., NEW YORK DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: RESEARCH IN REVIEW,
COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORTING AND ARREST RATES IN NEW
YORK STATE: ANALYSIS OF THE 1997 AND 2000 DOMESTIC INCIDENT
STATISTICAL DATABASES (2001), available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.
us/crimnet/ojsa/domviol_rinr/index.htm#15 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (finding
that in jurisdictions without pro-arrest policies the arrest rate ranged from 4 to
12 percent whereas in newly legislated pro-arrest jurisdictions the range was
15 to 30 percent); NEW YORK DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES,
FAMILY PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994:
EVALUATION OF THE MANDATORY ARREST PROVISIONS, SECOND INTERIM
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1998).
34
See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4 (surveying the first legal
casebook on domestic violence and exploring domestic violence’s relationship
with family law, criminal law, tort liability, civil rights and international
human rights); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of
Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 149, 153-63 (1978) (advising attorneys representing
battered women who have committed homicides after sexual or physical abuse
of ways in which to effectively defend the women); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex-Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15
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why we have the mandatory arrest law.35
So to give you a sense of impact, in 1996, and I think these
statistics are approximately correct, there were maybe about
5,000 domestic violence prosecutions in Brooklyn and maybe a
little less in Manhattan, Bronx, and Queens.36 After that, in 1997,
1998, 1999, you were looking at about 12,000 prosecutions.37 As
you can see, there was an incredible change and obviously that
change has significantly impacted the criminal justice system in a
tremendous way.
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 635-42 (1980) (arguing that individualization
of self-defense law can help to equalize treatment for battered women raising
self-defense claims); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing:
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198-200 (1986) (suggesting that
homicide cases in which expert testimony is offered to support a battered
woman’s self-defense claim “pose a dilemma of how we describe both
victimization and agency in women’s lives”). See generally NATHAN A.
ROSEN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN & FAMILY LAW, BATTERED WIVES:
A COMPREHENSIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES, BOOKS AND
STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1988) (listing and briefly
describing numerous works on the subject of domestic violence); Nancy Egan,
The Police Response to Spouse Abuse: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 91
LAW LIBR. J. 499 (1999) (documenting bibliographically the trends in the
ongoing research and debate in the area of the police response to spouse
abuse).
35
See, e.g., Symposium, Women, Children and Domestic Violence:
Current Tensions and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 629-72
(2000) (explaining the judicial and legislative origins of the Mandatory Arrest
Law). See also Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis
Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS (1984),
available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/minneapolisdve.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2003) (finding that mandatory arrest was most effective of
three standard police methods for reducing domestic violence, which created
an increase in mandatory arrest legislation in several states).
36
Statistics provided by Office of the Kings County DA Domestic
Violence Bureau.
37
Statistics provided by Office of the Kings County DA Domestic
Violence Bureau, available at http://www.brooklynda.org/Domestic%20
Violence/DV.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (reporting nearly 500 felony and
12,000 misdemeanor domestic violence cases prosecuted in 1998 by the Kings
County DA Domestic Violence Bureau, and over the past two years, the
felony dismissal rate has averaged 4.7 percent).
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Years ago, when domestic violence cases came into the
system and even though there weren’t that many, in fact, very
few, they were routinely disposed of immediately.38 When I say
disposed of, I mean dismissed. What you would see in every
criminal court across the entire country was this exact scenario.39
They would call the case to the calendar. The defendant would be
there and he would come up with his attorney. You would also
see the prosecutor there. Somebody would say, “Your Honor,
this is a D.V. case.” The next person you would see is the
victim—who was always in the audience—approach. The judge
38

During the 1980s, studies reported that 50 to 80 percent of domestic
violence cases were dismissed. See RICHARD R. PETERSON ET AL., NEW YORK
CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, COMPARING THE PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES TO NON-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN NEW YORK CITY
CRIMINAL COURTS, NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY FINAL
REPORT 3 (2001), available at http://www. nycja.org/research/reports/dv01.
pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (listing common reasons for the high dismissal
rate, including prosecutors’ perceptions of domestic violence as a private
matter and less serious than crimes against strangers, the reluctance of victims
to cooperate by pressing charges or testifying against the batterer either before
or during prosecution, and the difficulty in establishing strong evidence in
domestic violence cases where the abuse often takes place in the home with no
witnesses other than the parties to the incident).
39
The prevalence of this scenario has been noted elsewhere, cf. Elizabeth
Barravecchia, Expanding the Warrantless Arrest Exception to Dating
Relationships, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 579, 582 (2001) (noting that while
many battered women who summon police while under an attack later recant
their stories once the officers arrive, those that allow an arrest to occur will
often drop the charges soon after); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in
Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and
the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 39 (1999) (stating that victims
in domestic violence cases frequently drop their suits); Cheryl Hanna, The
Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM &
MARY L. REV. 1505, 1520 (1998) (reasoning that the lack of domestic
violence prosecution stems from several factors, including a victim’s refusal to
testify against her abuser); Nancy James, Domestic Violence: A History of
Arrest Policies and a Survey of Modern Law, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509, 513 (1994)
(noting that if a woman does insist that her abuser be arrested, she will
frequently telephone the jail the following day and ask that he be released from
custody, or, if prosecution has already commenced, she commonly requests
that the charges be dropped).
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would say usually, “Is the victim in the audience?” She would
come up. The judge would say, “Why are you here?” And the
victim would respond, “I want to dismiss the charges.”40 The
judge’s response would surprise many of you because you’re
very young, and so it is going to sound ridiculous but this is
exactly how the scenario would go. The judge would respond by
saying, “Has anybody threatened you to force you to drop the
charges?” And she would, of course, say “No.” The judge would
then say, “Is there any reason other than your own willingness to
drop the charges that you’re dropping the charges?”41 And she
would say, “No, it’s my free will.” The judge would then ask,
“Has anybody forced you to drop the charges?” She would again
say, “No.” The judge would say, “Case dismissed,” and that was
the end of it.
So from that scenario you can see that even if there was an
40

Barravecchia, supra note 39, at 582; Epstein, supra note 39, at 39;
Hanna, supra note 39, at 1520; James, supra note 39, at 513.
41
Others have noted domestic violence victims’ unwillingness to press
charges against their abusers. See, e.g., Gena L. Durham, The Domestic
Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied Responses Reflect Our
Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 651 (1998) (noting
that domestic violence victims are often overwhelmed with feelings of guilt
relating to the prospect of putting their husbands or boyfriends in jail and are
therefore less likely to cooperate with prosecutors); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to
Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (discussing that prosecutors have begun to
implement mandatory victim participation policies in domestic violence cases
as a response to the high number of dismissals that occur when a victim is
asked whether or not she would like to proceed and that victim noncooperation, reluctance or outright refusal to proceed are the major reasons for
lack of criminal prosecution); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach,
27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (pointing out that unlike victims of random
attacks, battered women often have compelling reasons for dismissing the
charges against their attackers including fear, economic dependence, and
affection, which makes these cases difficult to prosecute); Julia Weber, Courts
Responding to Communities: Domestic Violence Courts Components and
Considerations, 2 J. CENT. CHILD. & CTS. 23 (2000) (arguing that a “nodrop” policy of domestic violence prosecution recognizes that the dynamics of
domestic violence are such that perpetrators may try to coerce their partners
into not cooperating with partners).
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arrest, the case was gone by the first court date.42 So those cases
had no impact in criminal justice—and none in prosecution—for
many, many years. So from the prosecution standpoint, there has
been a sea change because you have this tremendous increase in
arrests and, more importantly, you don’t have that dismissal
scenario anymore.43 Therefore, not only are there arrests but also
there’s a lot of work put into the cases in a lot of courts.
You now see that in the criminal courts it’s very common to
have domestic violence cases represent about fifteen percent of
the court’s caseload.44 So you can see that that has made a
42

See Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic
Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 29 (2000) (stating
that domestic violence cases have had higher dismissal rates and less serious
sentences compared to other violent crimes); Donna Wills, Mandatory
Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Domestic Violence: The Case for
Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 177 (1997) (noting that
the “great majority of domestic violence victims have one characteristic in
common: after making the initial report, they have neither the will nor the
courage to assist prosecutors in holding the abusers criminally responsible”
and that they frequently recant their charge, minimize the abuse or simply fail
to appear in court).
43
See FERNANDEZ-LANIER, supra note 33 (describing the increase in
arrest rates resulting from implementation of mandatory arrest laws). See also
Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, $1 Million in Federal
and State Grants Allow Expansion of Domestic Violence Courts in New York
City (June 25, 1998). As of 1997, Brooklyn Supreme Court Domestic
Violence Part had a dismissal rate of 3.7 percent, a considerably low rate
since domestic violence cases are typically dismissed because the witnesses are
reluctant to testify. Id. See also supra note 37-38 and accompanying text
(reporting the decline in dismissals of domestic violence cases in the Kings
County DA Domestic Violence Bureau).
44
Judge Morgenstern stated that “in the Brooklyn Criminal Court, we
arraign over 100,000 cases every year. One out of every five cases is a
domestic violence case. . . . In New York City, in 1997, there were over
250,000 Domestic Incident Reports (DIRs) filed. In 1998, we had almost
300,000 DIRs,” although not all of these resulted in arrest and prosecution.
See Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions
and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 565, 684 (2000). At the end of
2002, there were more than 110,000 cases pending citywide in the criminal
courts. Of that number, 22,166 were domestic violence prosecutions. Statistics
provided by the Office of the Administrative Judge of the Criminal Courts of
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significant change for the courts and for everybody. So it’s a
change in the courts, and additionally, because of that—and all of
this sort of follows—there are now quite a few specialized courts.
So there are specialty felony domestic violence courts.45 There
are specialized misdemeanor domestic violence courts.46 So
additionally, the court system has moved all of these cases out of
the general court calendar and they are now in special parts. So
that’s also a change. Actually, with the exception of drugs in
some jurisdictions, there isn’t any other substantive field that has
its own court part in the same way that domestic violence does.47
the City of New York.
45
See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, NEW
YORK STATE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2000),
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/pdfdocs/domviolcourt.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). The increasing number of domestic violence cases
filed prompted the establishment of special courts to adjudicate these issues,
and Felony Domestic Violence Courts currently exist in Brooklyn, Bronx, and
Queens. Id. The Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, which opened in June
1996, served as a model for other domestic violence courts in New York state.
Id. See also Center for Court Innovation, Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court,
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/demo_04bdvc.html (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003).
46
See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, NEW
YORK STATE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2000),
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/pdfdocs/domviolcourt.pdf
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Courts were
established in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Manhattan; these courts focus
attention on the victim, assessing the level of potential danger that an offender
may pose since the charges may not reflect the gravity of harm that the victim
may be exposed to. Id. See also Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized
Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000) (describing the staffing and composition of
domestic violence courts with the goal to ensure that the judge and the
prosecution teams are promptly aware of any crisis and facilitate a rapid and
stringent measure to protect the victims).
47
See, e.g., OFFICE OF COURT OF DRUG TREATMENT, THE FIRST YEAR
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE (2002), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.
us/1styrdc.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (documenting the achievements of
the Office of Court of Drug Treatment in New York, created to address cycle
of addiction and recidivism in drug-related crime). See also OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY
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So that’s also a very significant change.
Now, those changes have obviously impacted everything. For
instance, in almost every prosecutor’s office there are separate
domestic violence bureaus.48 Therefore, if you’re a student and
you’re interested in working in domestic violence—and this again
applies to all the students in the clinics—and you want to do
domestic violence as a prosecutor, you can volunteer to be in the
domestic violence bureau. It’s interesting because for some
people that’s the first thing they want to do when they get to a
prosecutor’s office. For others, they’d rather stay as far away
from that as possible because, of course, they want to do
something really interesting like vehicle and traffic law cases. So
I always find that dichotomy very odd. But that’s the truth.
I’m here as a practitioner. So I’m going to tell you about
practice. You have that in almost every prosecutor’s office across
STATE AND COUNTY, OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2002) (providing detailed information about the number
of drug courts that have been operating for over two years, have recently been
implemented, or are being planned in each state).
48
See Office of the Bronx District Attorney, available at
http://www.bronxda.net/about_the_office/organizational_glossary.html
(last
visited Apr. 3, 2003); Office of the Brooklyn District Attorney, available at
http://www.brooklynda.org/domestic%20violence/dv.html (last visited Apr.
3, 2003) (“the Domestic Violence Bureau handles prosecution of all
misdemeanor and felony domestic violence cases as well as domestic violence
homicides.”); Office of the Manhattan District Attorney, available at
http://manhattanda.org/office_overview/trail/legal/fam_violence_right.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (describing its Family Violence and Child Abuse
Bureau as in charge of investigating and prosecuting crimes involving
domestic violence); Office of the Nassau District Attorney, available at
http://www.nassauda.org/DAWebpage/AnnualReports/sex_offense_and_dome
stic_violence_bereau_html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (explaining that the Sex
Offense and Domestic Violence Bureau prosecutes all felony domestic
violence cases and selected misdemeanors); Office of the Queens District
Attorney, available at http://www.queensda.org/DivisionsandBureaus.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (stating that the “Domestic Violence Bureau
prosecutes misdemeanor and felony cases involving domestic partners”);
Office of the Suffolk District Attorney, available at http://www.co.suffolk.ny.
us/da/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (“Family Crime Bureau is
responsible for the prosecution of all cases involving intimate partner and
family violence”).
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the country now. Another thing that’s very interesting to think
about—in the way this has changed everything dramatically—is
that domestic violence has really inspired the criminal justice
system to think about cases in a different way, which simply is
something called evidence-based prosecutions.49 This is
something I’m going to address very, very quickly.
Now, you’re all familiar with the fact that many victims in
domestic violence prosecutions do not want to press charges.
That used to be the really easy way to get rid of your caseload. If
somebody gave you ten domestic violence cases and you just
wrote on each case, “complaining witness doesn’t wish to
prosecute,” it was dismissed. That was the way it was.
That is not the way it is anymore.50 In the clinic that I teach—
49

One example of the Nassau County District Attorney’s policy of
“evidence based prosecution” is a case in 2000 where a defendant was indicted
“through the use of audiotapes of 911 calls and police observation testimony,”
even though the complainant did not cooperate. See Office of the Nassau
District Attorney, Sex Offense and Domestic Violence Bureau, available at
http://www.nassauda.org/DAWebpage/AnnualReports/sex_offense_and_dome
stic_violence_bereau_html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (stating that the bureau
responsible for domestic violence cases “prosecutes to the fullest extent
possible even when the complainant refuses to cooperate.”). See also Office of
the
Queens
District
Attorney,
available
at
http://www.queensda.org/DivisionsandBureaus.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2003) (stating that Assistant District Attorneys “have proceeded to trial on
cases without the cooperation or testimony of the victim, where there existed
other adequate and admissible evidence to support the charges.”). See
RICHARD R. PETERSON, NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, CROSSBOROUGH DIFFERENCES IN THE PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN
NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURTS (2002), available at http://www.nycja.
org/research/reports/boro2r36.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). In the Bronx,
the Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) primarily prosecuted cases in which
the domestic violence victims signed the complaint. Id. In Brooklyn, however,
ADAs prosecuted virtually all domestic violence cases pursuant to a no-drop
policy. Id. In the Bronx, only 80 percent of domestic violence arrests resulted
in prosecution, while in Brooklyn, 99 percent resulted in prosecution. Id. As a
result of prosecuting only the cases that the domestic violence victims choose
to cooperate, the conviction rate in the Bronx is 64 percent; in Brooklyn, it is
only 18 percent. Id.
50
See PETERSON, supra note 49 (indicating that Brooklyn’s ADAs’ nodrop prosecution policy produced a 99 percent prosecution rate, which was 19
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the Prosecutors’ Clinic—where we work primarily on domestic
violence cases, we look at each case to see if it’s triable without
the victim, as well as with the victim. I’d say that as a theory and
as a practice, there are many people who are in favor of it,51 and
many who aren’t.52 That would be the subject for an entire
percent higher as compared to the Bronx ADA’s office who primarily only
prosecuted cases in which the domestic violence victims signed the complaint).
See also Hanna, supra note 41, at 1860-64. “Many [prosecutor’s] offices now
have pro-prosecution or ‘no-drop’ policies. . . . Some states have adopted proprosecution legislation, and many others have officially endorsed its
adoption.” Id. “These policies actively encourage women to proceed through
the criminal justice system.” Id.
51
At least four states have adopted legislation encouraging no-drop
policies. See FLA. STAT. ch. 741.2901 (2002) (requiring the adoption of “proprosecution” policies and permitting the prosecuting attorney to disregard
victim reluctance when deciding whether to pursue a case); MINN. STAT. §
611A.0311 (2002) (requiring all county and city attorneys to develop
prosecution plans that address methods for gathering evidence other than the
victim’s in-court testimony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (2003) (disallowing
judicial dismissal of a domestic violence case at a victim’s request unless there
is “reasonable cause” to think that the victim would “benefit”); WIS. STAT. §
968.075 (2002) (directing all district attorneys offices to “develop, adopt and
implement written policies” that are not based on the victim’s consent to
prosecute a domestic abuse case). Other states have encouraged more
aggressive prosecution of domestic violence cases but do not specifically
address the impact of victim participation on prosecutorial decisions. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.8 (2003) (allocating funds for use by district
and city attorneys’ offices under the Spousal Abuser Prosecution Program);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (2002) (encouraging broad application of
remedies in criminal courts for domestic violence cases). See also Hanna,
supra note 41, at 1860-64 (advocating aggressive prosecution of domestic
violence but proposing that “rather than focus exclusively on whether the
victim is willing to testify at trial, prosecutors should develop strategies aimed
at gathering evidence that will overcome the presumption of innocence in
criminal cases. A proper investigation can reduce the likelihood that the victim
will ever have to take the stand.”).
52
For further analysis of varying viewpoints, see Renee L. Rold, All
States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception Statutes, 55 J. MO. B. 249,
249 (1999) (examining the concept of spousal privilege, discussing the various
statutes in jurisdictions enacted to enforce compelled victim testimony in
spousal domestic violence cases, and suggesting that compulsion statute
wrongly takes the decision to testify out of the victim’s hands); Renee
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separate panel. But we do that, and that’s changed things
dramatically too. Because, if you can imagine, you were
previously just dismissing all those cases, and now you’re
actually thinking about trying each of them with or without the
victim. This doubles and triples the work, and tripled the work
for every prosecutor.53 But it’s very interesting and it obviously
gives you a huge amount of experience with evidence, criminal
procedure, and trials. In fact—and this is not such a good story
since it is an odd story—but a couple of years ago, one of the
students from Brooklyn Law School was in the Prosecutors
Clinic and he had a domestic violence case where the victim was
uncooperative. We tried that case and the defendant was given
probation. Oddly enough, and not because we even knew about
it, two years later—and that was with one girlfriend—two years
later he got re-arrested for beating up his new girlfriend. The
case just happened to come to us and I recognized the name of
the defendant. And now we are involved in trying to prosecute
him for violating his sentence of probation.
I’m just going to quickly say that, from the defense
perspective, bringing all of these cases creates much more work
on the defense side. But there are a lot of very interesting areas
to work on in the defense side of domestic violence. For one
thing, mandatory arrest has done something unfortunate—it also
causes a lot of cross-complaints where the woman gets arrested at
the same time as the man.54 This is because the cops get to the
Romkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265
(2001) (emphasizing the growing acknowledgment among feminist legal
scholars that mandatory arrest and prosecution policies present nd problems
that deserve critical attention when developing policies to help protect
victims).
53
Cf. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2002) (noting that greater arrest incentives,
mandatory arrests and increased state record keeping requirements in domestic
violence have resulted in a dramatic increase in arrests of both men and
women, with increases running as high as 431 percent over one decade in one
large California county).
54
“Retaliatory arrests are very difficult because it does not obviously
present itself to either the police officer or to the District Attorney’s office at
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scene and they’re not sure who to arrest.55 So there’s a lot of
defense work of women who are being arrested under mandatory
arrest as well as under retaliatory complaints.56
I’m just going to quickly go through some of the problems I
wish I had known as a practitioner before entering the practice.
There are three things. You have to have a lot of patience and
tenacity. You have to be really interested, and you have to
that moment that there is a situation where we have got to sort out which one
it was.” Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current
Tensions and Emerging Issues, supra note 44, at 685. Furthermore, in
domestic violence situations, “[w]hen cross-complaints are filed in court, the
District Attorney’s hands are tied because both parties want to end the matter
in court, albeit for very different reasons. The District Attorneys cannot
communicate with either party without their attorneys present and the cases
are labeled “ACD” (adjourned in contemplation of dismissal) with limited
orders or dismissed outright.” Id.
55
See id. Judge Morgenstern explained that “[w]hen the domestic
violence officers would show up at that point, they would now have to make
an assessment as to who was the primary initial aggressor in the situation.” Id.
See also Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 57-60 (1992) (noting that the director of
the country’s first batterer’s treatment program testified before the Gender
Bias Study of the court system in Massachusetts that virtually every woman
referred to the program was a victim wrongly accused by the batterer of being
the aggressor).
56
A lawyer from Sanctuary for Families, Center for Battered Women’s
Legal Services, noted:
[i]n the early 1990s, it used to be that my primary assistance to my
clients was helping them convince the police to arrest the men who
had abused them. I find myself now in the position of spending most
of my time helping my clients not get arrested on retaliatory charges
made by their abuser. I find that the mandatory arrest law is being
used as a tool by abusers against women.”
Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions and
Emerging Issues, supra note 44, at 686. However, Professor Lisa Smith,
Director of Brooklyn Law School’s Criminal Clinical Program, emphasized
that the New York City Police Department has done special training in
Brooklyn on the primary aggressor law, and there has actually “been a drop in
cross-complaints in the courts, so much so that the judges actually
independently mentioned to me one day that they had noticed that the crosscomplaints were dropping dramatically.” Id.

DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC

442

7/7/03 11:06 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

understand that you’re opening a Pandora’s box when you’re
working in the field because you have to be willing to think about
yourself as a social worker, and as a psychologist.57 You have to
understand the cultural problems,58 language barriers,59 and other
barriers because people come in with a lot of handicaps and
disabilities.60 You have to be willing to be the kind of lawyer who
57

See Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the
Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have
Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1062 (1997) (noting that clinical
practice can help prepare lawyers for legal representation of women who have
been abused and pointing out that the practice involves a synthesis of elements
beyond purely legal rights and remedies, including a client’s vision of herself,
her experiences and her needs).
58
Violence against women is not limited by borders, culture, class,
education, socio-economic level or immigration status. For women and their
children who have immigrated to the United States, the dangers faced in
abusive relationships are often more acute; immigrant women not only face
pressures of cultural assimilation but also pressures of maintaining cultural
traditions, language barriers, economic insecurity and discrimination due to
gender, race or ethnicity. See Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan,
Offering A Helping Hand Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women a
History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95
(2000).
59
There is a lack of multilingual services provided to domestic violence
victims. Battered women may be forced to locate their own interpreters and a
victim may be forced to rely on community or family members who may be
connected to her batterer. Even if service is obtained, language may interfere
with the provision of adequate services; a limited-English speaker may find it
difficult to discuss her experiences with a monolingual-English-speaking
counselor or to live for a prolonged period in a shelter where only English is
spoken. See Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community
Responses from the Battered Women’s Movement and the Asian American
Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 165 (1996). See also Berta E. HernandezTruyol, Las Olvidadas—Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice: Latinas,
Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 354, 384 (1998).
Hernandez-Truyol notes that “[i]mmigrant Latinas who are victims of
domestic violence doubly suffer from such lack of services.” She posits that
“language difficulties or undocumented status can interfere with obtaining
information about services or gaining access to services that is compounded by
the additional obstacles of a possible inability to communicate with service
providers or fear of deportation for themselves.” Id.
60
See Conference, Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual
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doesn’t say, “I’m just doing criminal. I don’t need to know about
Medicare benefits, the school system, family court,” etcetera.61
Because you’re going to need to know about every single thing
that people are going to discuss here. Thank you.
Domestic Violence Conference: Mainstream Legal Responses To Domestic
Violence vs. Real Needs of Diverse Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 5455 (2001). Holly Devine, director of a program at New York City’s Barrier
Free Living that specializes in working with disabled victims of domestic
violence, noted:
[d]isabled women are dependent upon their abusers for everything,
and their abusers in most cases are their caregivers . . . . Their
abusers or caregivers may restrict their access to transportation.
Caregivers may withhold wheelchairs and medications, refuse to
assist with personal needs, leave their partners in bed all day and not
get them up to go to the bathroom, resist access to friends, those sorts
of neglectful type activities. So here is a disabled person who is
dependent upon their abuser. If they report the abuse, they lose the
person who gets them out of bed every day. They may lose their
children as well, because if they go to a shelter, if there is one
accessible for them, their children will have to go into foster care or
some other place. For all these reasons, on top of their isolation,
women with disabilities really do not have a lot of options and are
often fearful of reporting the abuse, which is why they stay in
dangerous situations significantly longer than non-disabled women. A
disabled woman will stay in an abusive situation 8.3 years versus 4.1
years for a non-disabled woman.
Id. Additionally, seven years ago, SafePlace, a Texas-based organization
recognized that disabled women were victims of domestic violence at a higher
rate than the general population. See Chuck Lindell, Grants Will Help Abuse
Victims Who Are Disabled, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 5, 2003, at
B1. “Women with disabilities are easier to victimize and harder to help
afterward, a devastating combination that Austin-based SafePlace has
struggled for seven years to correct . . . SafePlace last year won U.S. Justice
Department approval to run a national program helping disabled victims of
domestic violence.” Id.
61
To effectively provide for the needs of a battered client, a lawyer must
consider, among other things, child support, child custody, the psychological
impact on the client and the client’s safety. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, On the
Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 1225 (1996) (arguing that traditional legalistic approach to domestic
violence is ineffective and insensitive to the complex circumstances that give
rise to violence in intimate relationships).
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Professor Anthony Sebok
Thank you. I’m very honored to be asked to speak on this
issue. It is an issue which actually I see as continuous with a
larger question, which has to do with the relationship between
tort law, the education we receive in tort law and its application
to larger questions of social policy.
I think that one of the lessons in looking at a typical casebook
in tort law or looking at a syllabus is that concealed underneath
what appears to be a rather technical and formal set of concepts
are an incredible array of substantive decisions that are made by
courts, both at the level of judges and juries. And these decisions
get codified, and concretized in appellate decisions, which are
then taught to you in your casebook.
The problem with thinking about domestic violence from the
perspective of tort law is, I think, the following. Clearly, the
concepts which you want to learn in order to be a skilled torts
lawyer—or just a lawyer in general, so that you know what the
practice of civil liability looks like—are broad. And in fact, the
broadest and most important category really has to do with
accident law. Accident law has a number of deep concepts which
don’t necessarily hook up directly with what you might think of
as the primary area of interest for someone who is concerned
about domestic violence issues. But even here there is a bit of a
confusion. Because actually many of the concepts that need to be
raised in thinking about negligence law hide serious questions
about power and the distribution of power in society.
Currently, feminist scholars have written a great deal about
critiques of the tort system, mostly from the perspective of
looking at the negligence law system. However, within tort law
there is also the whole issue of intentional torts. I remember
when I began teaching torts, Regina Austin, a critical race
scholar at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and a
critical legal studies scholar, told me that she spends much of her
time in her first-year torts class talking about intentional torts.
I was a little surprised by this. But she explained to me that
many scholars who are progressive gravitate towards the
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intentional torts section of the first-year course. And the reason
for that is, of course, that with intentional torts there are an awful
lot of opportunities to think about how violence is visited upon
people who do not have real access to the criminal justice system,
and also how in intentional torts there may be creative ways to at
least recognize and perhaps even remedy the exercise of
violence.
There is not as much scholarship on intentional torts from a
feminist perspective as there ought to be, but there are a handful
of wonderful articles. I would point out in particular Clare
Dalton’s wonderful piece from 1997,62 and also a recent piece by
Jennifer Wriggins in the University of Southern California Law
Review called Domestic Violence Torts.63 I’ve learned an awful
lot about how to think about intentional torts by reading works
like these.
Now, in talking about the things that you might want to learn
from your torts course, an advanced torts class or thinking
further about torts on your own, and then of course talking to
torts practitioners like Betty Levinson, who is here today to speak
with us, I want to just point out that there is an incredible array
of ways in which the interactions between married and unmarried
62

Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319 (1997) (examining
the obstacles to intentional torts suits brought by the abused spouses). The
article begins with a proposal that the removal of interspousal immunity does
not leave spouses free to sue one another in intentional tort claims. Id. at 321.
Proceeding from the premise that there is a huge difference between simply
removing the obvious discrimination against such plaintiffs embodied in the
interspousal tort immunity and making the tort system genuinely hospitable to
them, it directs possible solutions to practitioners, judges and legislatures,
involving significant redesign of the tort system. Id. at 323.
63
Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121
(2001) (offering an approach to civil liability for domestic violence torts
through insurance reform because standard liability insurance policies, which
generally do not cover domestic violence torts, are one of the reasons for the
surprisingly small number of tort suits compared to the frequency with which
people are injured by domestic violence). The article proposes procedural
changes as a part of the solution for better access to the justice system. Id. at
176. It also addresses the relative lack of deterrence and compensation that the
tort system and insurance policies provide domestic violence torts. Id. at 124.
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individuals who have a domestic relationship manifest themselves
as torts.
To list just the intentional torts—and I apologize if this is
going to sound like a quick look at the table of contents of your
bar review course book—there are battery, assault, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. There is
also a whole way of categorizing many of these intentional acts
as negligence, for reasons which I’ll explain in a moment. That is
just in the personal injuries areas. False imprisonment is
technically personal injury.
Then in privacy and defamation, you can claim privacy
violations within the domestic context just like one can claim
privacy violations between strangers. You have to plead it right,
but you could. Similarly there are, of course, opportunities for
slander and libel, since disputes between individuals involving a
great deal of vitriol do actually manifest themselves in false
statements made about each other. Finally—and I wonder how
much we will have a chance to talk about this today—there is a
very interesting area in which some aspects of both divorce law
and also relations between unmarried couples present questions
about fraud and conversion, because property is involved. And so
you have the whole panoply of common law tort brought in the
interaction between individuals who have domestic relations with
each other.
Now, the bad news is that one reason why many cases don’t
seem to present themselves in your torts casebook this way—for
example, we could of course think about some cases that could
have been, like the famous Tarasoff case, is an example of a
boyfriend murdering an ex-girlfriend.64 Or the whole question
about subjective versus objective judgment in defense in battery
could also be raised in that context.
But I’m not going to sugarcoat this. It doesn’t happen too
often. And why it doesn’t happen too often is not just because of
64

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
(holding that when a psychotherapist determines or should determine that his
patient presents a serious danger of violence to another person, the
psychotherapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger).
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the inherent sexism of the casebook authors, although that might
be an explanation. It is also because—and here we’ll have to
speak with Ms. Levinson about this—there are certain very
simple barriers as to why a large volume of cases do not make it
up into the appellate courts, and maybe not even to filings and
I’m going to briefly mention them. I think you may want to go
into them in greater depth another time.
First of all, the lack of insurance of defendants makes it
somewhat tricky for lawyers to take on cases. They may have
insurance, but if it is an intentional tort their insurance won’t
cover them. New York State, for example, doesn’t allow
insurance contracts to be written that cover intentional torts, and
this is true for a vast majority of states. So there you have simply
a system of judgment-proof defendants. One famous defendant
who may or may not be judgment-proof is O.J. Simpson. He was
sued and actually lost a tort action against him for wrongful
death. I suspect that the plaintiffs will eventually—if they have
not already—locate personal assets to recover. But you can
imagine that it is a very tricky proposition to structure tort law as
a response to violence between domestic partners when insurance
is a problem.
Secondly, and this is an interesting way in which one can
frame the teaching of a torts class. It happened to me this
morning. I realized, as I was teaching a statute of limitations
case, that I could teach it from this perspective. But statute of
limitations is in fact a tricky problem when you’re talking about
intentional torts. The short statute of limitations makes it hard for
people to bring claims, especially when they are afraid of
retaliation if they’re intending to pursue divorce later on or if
they’re intending to try and extricate themselves, given that there
may be children in common or property in common. So the short
statute of limitations makes suing for intentional torts very, very
difficult, which is why you don’t see very many claims. There
are also some very interesting cases on the question of continuing
torts, as well as on the question of equitable tolling. But the law
does not look very good.
Finally, the law of damages itself presents an interesting
problem about how to measure and how to award damages.
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Naturally, you’d think that this would be a wonderful area where
punitive damages would be a great way for torts practitioners to
use the skills that they have. But what we can talk about later is
why juries are not necessarily sympathetic in the framing of
punitive damages in cases including intentional torts against
women as they might be in other contexts.
I think that’s where I’m going to end it now, because what I’d
like to hear more about is how these problems get played out in a
variety of contexts, including the context of divorce, because I
think that’s really one of the biggest problems. Thank you.
Betty Levinson
It is a pleasure to be with you. As I begin our discussion
about tort and other civil remedies for victims of domestic
violence, I want to first connect with Lisa’s reference to criminal
court allocutions.65 As I listened to her comments, I thought back
to 1973, my last semester here at Brooklyn. Parenthetically,
Nancy Erickson, whose work has been acknowledged by Stacy
Caplow,66 and I were in the same section. I am glad that we are
all here together today.
During that semester I was a member of the first class of
students permitted to appear in criminal court under the aegis of
the Legal Aid Society, as it implemented the new “student
practice” rules.67 We worked down the block on Schermerhorn
Street, standing up for real clients in the arraignment part. Each
time an assault case came in, the judge demanded to know the
whereabouts of the complainant. If the assault was of the
domestic variety, he would ask, “Where’s the wife?” or
“Where’s the girlfriend?” and the case would invariably be
65

See presentation of Professor Lisa Smith, supra pp. 430-44.
See presentation of Professor Stacy Caplow, supra pp. 418-30.
67
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (McKinney 2002) (allowing students to practice
a limited amount of law and perform all of the essential lawyering functions in
the jurisdictions including meeting with clients and witnesses to gather facts,
analyzing legal problems and providing legal advice, negotiating matters on
behalf of clients with opposing parties and representing clients before courts
and administrative tribunals under faculty supervision).
66
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dismissed as a mere “domestic dispute.”68 If the case involved
strangers, the question was, “Where’s the victim?” This was
followed with inquiries regarding the severity of the injuries to
determine if the offense was a misdemeanor or felony.
In the years since then, awareness about the nature and
impact of domestic violence has grown.69 We have ads in the
subway and public service messages in magazines and
newspapers. Daytime TV is filled with domestic violence on talk
shows, not to mention the soaps. Many people have become
more thoughtful about this problem and no longer automatically
go into victim-blaming gear.70 We better understand the shame
and fear that make it so difficult for a domestic violence victim to
be public about her painful private life.71 We observe the
68

Other commentators have noted this phenomena. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 104–06 (2000)
[hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN] (suggesting that the domestic
violence victim’s stories are often marginalized in the courtroom).
69
For example, approximately 5 percent of employers have established
policies pertaining to domestic violence. See Cycles of Silence: More
Employers Today Are Doing Their Part to Help Employees in Abusive
Relationships, CINCINNATI POST, June 4, 2002, at 1B (“For years, employers
considered domestic violence a private matter, an issue best kept behind closed
doors . . . . [Today] [a]bout 5 percent have policies that specifically address
domestic violence”). In addition, some police departments have procedures for
responding to domestic violence calls that allow officers to arrest the offender
if someone has been beaten regardless of whether the victim decides to press
charges. See presentation of Professor Lisa Smith, supra pp. 430-44
(discussing changes in processing and prosecuting domestic violence cases in
New York City).
70
In fact, Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) is generally admissible as
part of a self-defense claim when a woman is charged with murder. See, e.g.,
People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (stating that BWS is not
a complete defense but is evidence of the defendant’s state of mind relevant to
a legally accepted defense, such as justification, and holding that a woman on
trial for the second degree murder of her boyfriend could submit expert
testimony related to her condition as a battered woman); People v. Garcia, 1
P.3d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding evidence of BWS admissible as to the
general validity of a self defense claim; such evidence goes toward
establishing whether, from the defendant’s viewpoint, she was justified in
using deadly force).
71
This difficulty has been noted elsewhere. For example in the process of
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powerful draw of the abusive partner, as well as the nature of the
emotional harms that inevitably accompany physical injuries.
Despite this progress, we are still challenged by the need to truly
bring this knowledge home—not just to the trenches where we
lawyers work—but beyond, to the policy makers, and ultimately
to our legislators, who create the standards for civil behavior and
the remedies for their breach. We still have a lot of work to do.
Over the years, virtually every person I have worked with
who has been a victim and then a survivor of domestic violence
has been clear: the permanent injuries of most domestic violence
are not physical, they are emotional.72 They are the psychic,
long-lasting pains of betrayal by somebody you had every reason
and right to trust. Abuse by a trusted person—a domestic partner,
a parent, a teacher, a psychotherapist, a clergy person—should
not be treated as a garden variety tort, as the current crisis in the
Catholic Church prompts us to remember. The power of the
intimate abuser over his victim carries with it an imperative of
silence. When the nature of the wrong makes such silence
foreseeable, laws requiring prompt action remove any possibility
of redress. Even sympathetic judges can do no more than point to
the legislature for hope of reform, as has been demonstrated in
the case law of childhood sexual abuse.73
construction and location of a $3 million women’s shelter in Milwaukee
Wisconsin, the center and its staff expressed hope that “shedding the secrecy
of [the building’s] location will increase awareness of domestic violence” and
eliminate the privacy of the abuse. Ana Caban, Public Appeal Begins For
Shelter, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2002, at 3B. “Privacy was
once closely guarded as a way of preventing more violence against women and
children. Becoming public, however, is a way of holding the perpetrator more
accountable, . . . and a way of telling the community, ‘[l]et’s all help to solve
this problem’ of domestic violence.” Id.
72
Cf. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1191, 1216-19 (1993) (noting that the psychological impact of domestic
violence and abuse reaches beyond depression, anxiety, or nightmares, and
that “[p]sychological reactions to violence also include the ways in which
battered women have come to think about the violence, themselves, and others
as a result of their experiences.”).
73
For example, one opinion noted that “[i]t may be that special
legislation is necessary to protect the civil rights of the defenseless victims.”
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Our procedural and substantive laws on the civil side do not
provide a welcome mat to domestic violence victims.74 Given the
fact that the vast majority of domestic assaults are charged as
misdemeanors or violations, tort claims pleading significant
emotional injuries are legally hobbled when not accompanied by
serious physical injuries. In addition, tort attorneys, paid on
contingency fee agreements, are generally unwilling to litigate
cases without the promise of a substantial recovery, which, at
present, goes hand-in-hand only with such physical injuries.
In the absence of state law that would presumptively permit
domestic violence victims to obtain meaningful financial
compensation for their psychological as well as physical injuries,
civil remedies, either in the tort sphere or within the matrimonial
law context, however, turn a cold shoulder toward domestic
violence victims. In New York, courts have been unfriendly to
both married and single women seeking tort remedies for the
psychological injuries sustained because of domestic violence.75
The court of appeals ruled out any cause of action for damages
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress between
married people,76 a rule of law that continues to disallow such
claims until the present time.77 The same result applies to
Hoffman v. Hoffman, No. 30040/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 8, 1988) aff’d, 162
A.D.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
74
Statutes of limitations present the most obvious example. See, e.g.,
Wriggins, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting the relatively short statutes of
limitations for intentional torts compared to negligence and strict liability, and
how the dynamics of domestic violence can make filing a tort claim near the
time the injuries are sustained difficult if not impossible).
75
See, e.g., Weiker v. Weiker, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1986) (stating
that recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress should not apply to
marital disputes); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div.
1985) (reducing an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress to an
ex-girlfriend because there was no evidence that her injuries were permanent).
76
Weiker, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (finding that allowing recovery for
intentional infliction of mental distress in disputes arising out of matrimonial
differences would “result in the revival of evils which prompted the
Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation”).
77
See, e.g., Reich v. Reich, 657 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (App. Div. 1997)
(holding that a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress between
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unmarried co-habitants.78
Furthermore, in the tort arena, the statute of limitations for
assault and other intentional torts is typically very short.79 In New
York, it is just one year.80 It often takes a battered woman
numerous attempts to permanently break away from an abusive
partner. A domestic violence survivor is likely to be emotionally
bound to her abuser even after physical separation.81 Thus, the
expectation that she should be in a position to sue within one year
is unrealistic. Here, I can’t help but observe that the statute of
limitations for breach of contract in New York is six years,82
which speaks volumes about our legislature’s priorities.
One recently achieved exception to New York’s one-year
statute of limitations arises if an adult domestic violence victim
spouses is not actionable).
78
See Williams v. Lynch, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (App. Div. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff could not maintain an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where her “allegation was not atypical in a matrimonial
dispute and did not rise to the level of atrocity or outrageousness to sustain
such a claim.”); Artache v. Golden, 133 A.D.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(holding that there was no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion
distress in New York arising out of an oral partnership agreement by the
parties who cohabitate and hold themselves out to be husband and wife);
Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that it would be
contrary to public policy to recognize recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in the context of a “dispute arising out of the differences”
occurring between persons who, although not married, have been living
together as husband and wife for an extended period of time).
79
For example, California, Texas and New Jersey have a two year statute
of limitations for intentional torts. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 335.1 (2003); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.003(a) (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2 (West
2003).
80
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 2003).
81
See, e.g., Barriers to Leaving a Violent Relationship, National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, at http://www.ncadv.org/problem/
barriers.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (detailing the reasons why women stay
in violent relationships as well as why they may feel emotionally bound to
their abusers). During non-violent phases, a victim can view her abuser as a
“good man” who fulfills her dreams of romantic love. Id.
82
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 2003) (stating that an action upon
a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, must be commenced
within six years).
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can show that her injuries—physical, emotional, or economic—
were so severe as to render her incapable of functioning in
society.83 The decision in the case, Nussbaum v. Steinberg,84 on
which I served as plaintiff’s attorney and Liz Schneider acted as
counsel for amicus curiae, contains language that vividly
describes the intensity of a battered victim’s connection to her
abuser.85 I am glad to say that the domestic violence survivor
whose efforts to effectuate this precedent, Hedda Nussbaum, is
with us today.
In the Nussbaum case, it was the physical element of the tort
that provided the basis for damages, as opposed to the emotional
injuries.86 Again, emotional pain and suffering, to be
compensable, requires a physical injury. Psychological injuries
alone constitute second-class damages, as illustrated in Roy v.
Hartogs, where an emotionally ill patient became the sexual prey
of her psychiatrist.87 Although a jury awarded significant

83

Nussbaum v. Steinberg, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2000).
Id. at 33. See also Court Decisions, First Judicial Department, New
York Part [hereinafter, Court Decisions], N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1997, at 26,
col. 3 (reproducing the opinion of special referee Liebman that allowed tolling
of the statute of limitations for insanity in a domestic violence case where the
victim was so overpowered by her abuser that she became unable to
independently function in society and protect her legal rights).
85
Court Decisions, supra note 84. Stating that in cases of domestic
violence:
the abuser and the victim are generally found to be in a close or
intimate relationship. The destructive impact of violence in such an
intimate relationship may be so complete that the victim is rendered
incapable of independent judgment even to save one’s own life. In
various forms, the victim may very well turn to the tormentor for
connection and support.
Id.
86
Id. (stating that “[a] factual demonstration on the record of physical,
emotional and even economic abuse can serve as an evidentiary basis for
demonstrating that one is incapable of pursuing their legal rights” and entitled
to an extension of the one-year statute of limitations in New York).
87
381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that a plaintiff who
claimed that her psychiatrist had sexual intercourse with her for thirteen
months as part of her therapy could sustain a cause of action for malpractice).
84
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damages, the appellate division drastically reduced the award.88
Remedies for domestic violence occurring within the
marriage relationship have been equally unavailing. When we
think about the intersection of domestic violence and divorce, we
remember our family law courses, and history in which women
were the property of husbands and subject to his “chastisement,”
provided a wife was beaten by a stick no thicker than his
thumb.89 For centuries, the notion of a wife suing her husband for
exercising his rights was legally without merit.90 Gradually, over
time, legal impediments for women were lifted with the
introduction of the Married Women’s Acts91 and the repeal of
interspousal immunity in many jurisdictions.
Faced with procedural and substantive impediments to
obtaining damages, attorneys have sought alternative theories by
which to obtain appropriate compensation for clients, such as
negligence and fraud, which was the basis for recovery in
Maharam v. Maharam.92 The defendant husband in Maharam
was liable for failing to inform his wife that he had contracted

88

Id. at 589. The appellate court modified the jury award of $153,697.50
in compensatory and punitive damages, holding that compensatory damages
greater than $25,000 were excessive and that the plaintiff could not recover
punitive damages. Id.
89
For discussions of the historical treatment of abused wives in the law,
see generally Ray Thomas, History Has Been Brutal for Women, 62 TEX. B.J.
903 (1999); Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law From
1750: A Bibliographic Essay, 11 S. CAL. Rev. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1
(2001).
90
See, e.g., Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife
Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359,
340-41 (1984) (stating that the “perception of the marital relationship gave
husbands the legal right to beat their wives because married women were
considered ‘nonpersons,’ they enjoyed virtually no rights—not even the right
to be free from physical beatings.”).
91
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (West 2001) (providing a
married woman with a right of action for an injury to her person, property or
character, or for an injury arising out of the marital relation, as if unmarried).
92
575 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1991). Wife sought monetary
damages as a result of husband allegedly transmitting venereal disease to her.
Id.
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herpes.93 However, it was by the plaintiff’s reliance upon an
imperative in the Public Health Law, rather than any law or
attitude recognizing the nature of domestic violence, that
permitted her to sue for money damages.94
Some attorneys have turned to the matrimonial sphere to
pursue economic recognition of physical and emotional injuries
sustained by domestic violence victims. In New York, the
divorce cause of action under which a wife must sue is “cruel
and inhuman treatment,” which requires a showing that the
defendant has engaged in conduct that “so endangers the physical
or mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or
improper for the plaintiff to co-habit with the defendant.”95
However, the level of cruel and inhuman treatment that may be
actionable in a short marriage will not suffice in a marriage of
long duration,96 increasing the burden of proof for a domestic
violence victim in a longer marriage. To compound this problem,
there is a five-year statute of limitations for cruel and inhuman
treatment.97 A wife who remains with—or even separates from—
an abusive husband and does not bring an action within five years
cannot obtain a divorce on cruelty grounds.98 Again, the current
93

Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1986). The
appellate court ruled that the husband had an affirmative legal duty to disclose
that he had genital herpes to his wife based on a section of the Public Health
Law which provided that “any person who, knowing himself or herself to be
infected with an infectious venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with
another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 107. See also N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 2003).
94
Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (noting that the wife alleged that the
husband was grossly negligent in failing to disclose the fact that he had genital
herpes, which was the proximate cause of her injury). The court found that
“[t]his states a legally cognizable claim inasmuch as the husband’s alleged
conduct violates section 2307, a statute enacted for public health and safety,
and may therefore be negligent per se.” Id.
95
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (Consol. 2003).
96
See, e.g., Hessen v. Hessen, 353 N.Y.2d 421, 426-27 (1974) (holding
that the level of cruel and inhuman treatment that must be established in a
divorce proceeding increases with the duration of the marriage).
97
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 210 (Consol. 2003).
98
Id.
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statutes ignore the many reasons why an abused wife may not be
able to bring an action within the requisite time, thus preventing
her from obtaining a judgment of divorce, or, as likely, forcing
her to accept undesirable settlement terms. Moreover, the
standard settlement agreement contains a general release that
waives any right to sue on any cause of action occurring prior to
the execution of the agreement.
New York divorce law has never contemplated the explicit
granting of financial compensation to an abused spouse. Before
1980, title controlled the distribution of property—most typically
to the husband—and alimony was available to a dependent
spouse. However, no matter how badly abused the wife was, if
she was guilty of marital misconduct, her right to alimony was
extinguished.99
In 1980, New York’s Equitable Distribution Law became
effective, creating a new genus of marital property. However, the
statute is facially blind to fault and in the twenty or more years
since its effective date, only a handful of cases have weighted the
distribution of property in a fashion that recognizes the impact of
egregious behavior by an abusive spouse.100 I believe Kristin will
talk about one such recent case, Johnston v. Martin, 101 handled
by her office.
The result of our statutory framework is that if a stranger
strikes me and does me significant physical and/or emotional
injury, I can sue him for my medical expenses, my pain and
suffering, as well as punitive damages. If my husband assaults
me, however, my principal remedy is divorce, under the “cruel

99

See generally David Kaufman, Note, The New York Equitable
Distribution Statute: An Update, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 845 (1987) (explaining
that prior to the passage of section 236 of the New York Domestic Relations
Law, New York courts were required to award property upon divorce to the
spouse that held title to the property, often resulting in the husband being
awarded the property).
100
Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (App. Div. 2002) (citing the
trial court’s finding that the husband’s behavior was “so egregious as to ‘shock
the conscience’ and relied on its equitable powers to render justice between the
parties.”).
101
See presentation of Kristin Bebelaar, infra pp. 460-73.
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and inhuman treatment” provisions of the Domestic Relations
Law,102 and I have no right to compensation above and beyond
my “equitable share” of the marital estate, and perhaps a claim
for spousal maintenance—particularly if I have been so badly
injured I am unable to work.103 If there is no marital estate at the
time of the divorce judgment, and if my husband currently has no
significant income, I’m out of luck.
While the result in Johnston is correct, it does not grapple
with the underlying problem—that is, current remedies do not
presumptively entitle an abused spouse to compensation for the
physical and emotional injuries suffered during marriage either
by way of a larger share of the marital estate or payment in the
nature of damages.104 In addition, the financial circumstances of
the family at the time of judgment are those upon which the court
102

See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (Consol. 2003). Providing that
“[t]he cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that
the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental well being of
the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with
the defendant.” Id.
103
A court may award maintenance “in such amount as justice requires.”
N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part B, (6)(a) (Consol. 2003). In determining the
amount of maintenance to award, courts consider a variety of factors,
including the parties’ health and earning capacities and the ability of the party
seeking maintenance to become self-supporting. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part
B, (6)(a)(2)-(4) (Consol. 2003). The statute also allows a maintenance award
for “any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part B, (6)(a)(11) (Consol. 2003).
104
See generally Dalton, supra note 62, at 387. The author states:
If an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subsequent to a
divorce, the spouse will be forced to elect between three equally
unacceptable alternatives: (1) Commence a tort action during the
marriage and possibly endure additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in
a divorce action and waive the right to a jury trial on the tort claim;
or (3) commence an action to terminate the marriage, forego the tort
claim, and surrender the right to recover damages arising from
spousal abuse. To enforce such an election would require an abused
spouse to surrender both the constitutional right to a jury trial and
valuable property rights to preserve his or her well-being. This the
law will not do.
Id.
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must make its determination, without reference to the abuser
spouse’s separate property. This excludes from judicial
consideration the possibility that the abuser may have secreted
assets and income or that he may vastly improve his financial
standing after the entry of judgment. If an award were made
without reference to the family’s present economics, a judgment
for such damages would function like any money judgment under
New York state law, that is, it would be effective for a period of
twenty years.105
Another area where domestic violence and tort law may
intersect is on issues regarding the liability of a third party. For
example, is a police department that is aware of an order of
protection but fails to take action to enforce it liable for money
damages? In Connecticut, the answer is yes.106 In New York,
unless the plaintiff victim can show a “special relationship” to
obtain a finding of police negligence, she has no remedy.107 In
addition, even if there is an actionable claim, the police
department will implead the abuser, thus, substantially reducing
its share of damages.
As we make efforts to further modify our laws to provide
remedies for victims of domestic violence, we should be mindful
of what Candace mentioned about having our antennae sensitized
to picking up issues of domestic violence.108 In many spheres, not
necessarily those that immediately announce themselves,
domestic violence is just beneath the surface. For example, the
client who comes for help regarding a real estate dispute with her
former lover may not feel comfortable speaking about the

105

See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 211(a) (McKinney 2003).
See, e.g., Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)
(finding a cognizable cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause where
the police afforded more protection to those who were abused by non-relatives
but did not devote the same level of attention and care when the abuser was
the spouse or relative of the victim).
107
See, e.g., Sorichetti v. New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461 (1985) (holding the
police department liable for negligence only when a special relationship exists
between the city and the infant because of an order of protection).
108
See presentation of Candace Sady, supra pp. 414-15.
106
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intimate details of their abusive relationship.109 However, the
outcome may turn on the fact that there have been allegations of
domestic violence. By way of another example, the fact that a
client is afraid of her life partner may influence the manner in
which a will is drafted.110
As practitioners, we need to elicit all facts that will enable us
to properly counsel our clients, even in cases where domestic
violence may not seem to have any role in the problem the client
has presented to us. Unless we can make our clients comfortable
enough to trust us with such information, we may be missing a
big piece of the picture.
In conclusion, we need to keep focused on all levels of
concern. The legislature should be persuaded to bring current tort
law into the modern era by making it accessible to victims of
domestic violence who would otherwise be foreclosed by short
statutes of limitation. Trial and appellate courts should be
encouraged to recognize the depth of the psychological injuries
suffered by victims of domestic abuse. Furthermore, attorneys
should be attuned to the unspoken in order to permit injured
clients to feel comfortable enough to describe what is, for most
people, unspeakable.111
109

See Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish for: An Examination
of Arrest and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence in Cases in Two
Cities in Michigan, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (1999) (discussing generally
that victims of domestic violence are reluctant to report abuse and pursue
criminal action for fear of inciting more abuse from their abuser).
110
A victim’s fear of her abuser may intersect with her anxiety about
being able to obtain assistance from the judicial system. See Betty Levinson,
Handling the Domestic Violence Case 2000, 82 PLI/NY 11, 20 (2000).
Therefore, attorneys must be sensitive to their clients’ doubts and fears and
may have to adjust settlement or trial strategies in response. Id. at 21.
Attorneys must maintain professional competence and the zealous
representation of their clients, which requires awareness of all relevant aspects
of law that could impact the handling of any particular issue in domestic
violence cases. Id. at 23.
111
The difficulties of open communication between abused clients and
their legal counsel have also been noted elsewhere. See, e.g., Bruce J.
Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context:
Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identify and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft
Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 901, 907 (1998) (noting that when a client
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Kristin Bebelaar
I have to say at the outset that I am honored and frankly, a
little nervous to be on this panel. I’ve been practicing law for
about six years and it’s hard for me to believe that I’m on a panel
with the people who taught me much of what I know. I took
Professor Rosato’s Family Law class. I took Professor
Schneider’s Women and the Law class and I was a research and
teaching assistant in her course on Battered Women and the Law.
I took Professor Sebok’s Jurisprudence class. I worked on an
amicus brief in a battered woman’s tort case with Ms. Levinson
when I was a law student. I have worked on a case opposite
Patricia Fersch, who’s going to talk about family law practice,
and I have long respected her practice as an attorney. So I’m a
little intimidated but I am very honored to be here. I’m glad that
Professor Thomas spoke about the issues of mutual assent and
duress,112 because I think those issues are important aspects of
contracts law in the context of battering, but I’m not going to
have time to talk about them today.
Professor Schneider has written extensively on battering and
the law.113 As her work makes clear, battering is a major social
is unwilling to engage in an open discussion, the attorney should observe the
client for signs of agitation, anger, and distress and be sensitive to the client’s
anxiety level and proceed gently).
112
The remarks of Professor Chantal Thomas are not reproduced here.
113
Professor Schneider has authored or co-authored many articles and
books on the subject of domestic violence and women’s rights. See, e.g.,
DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4; SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra
note 69; Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Legal
Profession: the Impact of Law and Legal Theory: Feminist Legal Theory,
Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249
(1998); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
477 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges
of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 520, 522 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Particularity and Generality];
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 263 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV.
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problem, as well as a touchstone of feminist theory and activism.
Therefore, battering is an excellent subject in which to teach
students two things every practicing attorney comes to know.
First, it is the rare case that fits precisely into only one area of
law, which is why a good lawyer must be familiar with all areas
of law.114 Second, in every case, there is both a “specific
picture,” the facts as your client initially presents them to you,
and a “big picture,” the story the court will recognize as fitting
into a particular area or areas of law.115 Inevitably, your client’s
story is more complex than the set of facts and legal concepts a
court wants to hear about. However, as your client’s attorney,
you must address both the issues that are significant to your client
and the ones that will be significant to the court.116
Domestic violence is an excellent vehicle to teach these two
concepts because domestic violence comes up in the facts, and
thus, has legal effects on cases in virtually every legal category.
Additionally, cases involving clients who have experienced
violence in a relationship usually involve the kind of complexity
that requires lawyers and law students to focus on both the
“specific picture” and the “big picture.”
623, 632 (1980).
114
See, e.g., Meier, supra note 29, at 1296 (noting that practicing
domestic violence law requires some degree of knowledge in other disciplines,
including but not limited to psychology, sociology, public policy, and criminal
law).
115
See Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 567
(acknowledging the difficulty with accurately describing the experiences of
battered women and in conveying this understanding to the courts). “Although
the battered women’s movement has had to demonstrate distinctive aspects of
the problem of battering in order to establish battered women as a legal and
social construct, the characterizations of distinctiveness have been incomplete,
have not explained fully the complex experiences of battering, and have
constrained feminist analysis.” Id.
116
See, e.g., Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Interviewing Battered Women, in
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM
115, 127-29 (Ronald E. Cohen & James C. Neely ed., 2d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter LAWYER’S MANUAL] (discussing the various issues victims of
domestic violence face in addition to the legal proceeding their lawyer was
retained to handle, such as the client’s personal safety concerns, and
psychological needs).
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I should preface my comments on the specific case I will
discuss today by saying that it is perhaps misleading to say that I
am a “contracts practitioner.” I am a general civil practitioner. I
approach every case, whether it is presented to me as primarily a
torts case or a family law case or a discrimination case or a
contracts case, holistically, as I think most lawyers do—at least
that’s what my professors at Brooklyn Law School taught me. I
separate out different legal issues from one another and most
cases fall primarily into one category or another, but I also need
to understand how the different legal aspects of a particular case
affect each other.117
The case I will focus on in my comments today is a
“contracts” case in the sense that it involves drafting and
executing a contract, but the contract has to do with the sale of
real property. Therefore, in order to properly draft it, I had to
utilize property law principles because it was a contract between
people with a history of relationship violence. I also had to utilize
what some would characterize as family law principles, as well
as criminal law principles, in advising my client and in drafting
the contract. Similarly, in this, as in every case, I had to
understand how the facts a client brings me fit into various legal
categories and rules. To do that, I have to start by really listening
to my client.
Working with a client who has been abused involves some
skills I think most people don’t learn in law school: the skill of
listening.118 Listening not just to the words your client is saying,
but to her body language and the words left unsaid.119 Some of
117

Similar client interviewing and counseling techniques have been
explored elsewhere. See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., ET AL., THE
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 12-16 (1999) (stating that lawyers often
control the direction of their client’s case by fitting the situation into areas of
law with which they are more comfortable and that lawyers also serve as
gatekeepers to the legal system by screening out issues that may not have legal
bases).
118
See generally SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69
(discussing the complexities of understanding and evaluating a battered
woman’s needs).
119
Id. See also Meier, supra note 29, at 1334-35 (noting that an attorney
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this is perhaps something that can’t be taught in three years of
law school. I learned it largely by working with people in the
process of freeing themselves from abuse. Coming to understand
that process entailed understanding that while there are elements
of the process that are common, each person’s process is also
different.
Professor Schneider refers to this as the “complexities of
voice.”120 She points out that practitioners must understand that
battered women have both a different voice as a group and
different voices as individuals.121 She writes about the importance
of understanding the interplay between what she calls
“particularity and generality.”122 In other words, there are
experiences and themes that are common to every abused
person’s story, yet each person’s particular life experience will
inform her experience of abuse and how she communicates—or
doesn’t communicate—that experience.123
should encourage communication by developing an understanding with his or
her client which would entail knowing the client’s feelings by being able to
identify “nonverbal cues” such as body language).
120
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 62-73 (discussing
that the term battered woman does not capture the range of abuse, in terms of
circumstances or type, that face women and there is a need to understand the
variety of contexts in which abuse occurs in order to appropriately address the
issues in a legal forum).
121
Id. at 62 (asserting that effective counseling, as well as legal assistance
for a “battered woman” must take into consideration not only the needs of the
individual case but also consider pressures asserted on the victim by her
community that may make her reluctant to report the abuse or pursue
prosecution of the abuser).
122
Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 522.
Professor Schneider argues that lawyers must take into account the particular
experiences of abused women as well as the general violence against women in
society. Id. She defines “particularity” as “describing the complexity of
women’s experiences non-simplistically, accurately, and in greater detail.” Id.
She divides the general problems of violence against women into two
categories: “the way in which woman-abuse must be viewed as linked to
larger societal violence” and the way it is “linked to women’s subordination in
general.” Id. See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 59,
71.
123
See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 59, 71.
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Second, as Professor Schneider writes, lawyers need to
understand that battered women are often heard, yet not really
heard—and for many women, this experience affects the way
they tell their story.124 In other words, within the relationship they
are often repeatedly “gaslighted,” or convinced that their
experience is not reality, that they are “crazy.”125 When they try
to tell others about the abuse, they are often not listened to or not
believed or are asked what they did to deserve or cause the
abuse, implying that it must be their fault. They learn to be
hesitant about telling their story or not to tell it at all. They often
feel a great deal of shame about the abuse, in part because their
abusers often convince them it is their fault or that they deserved
it.
I think battered women may be more hesitant to discuss the
abuse today than they have ever been, because women are
expected to be strong and autonomous in ways they weren’t ten
or twenty years ago. Today, there are women whose strength and
self-sufficiency in their work lives makes it much harder for them
to admit to abuse at home. Certainly the average woman I deal
with in my practice is in her thirties to fifties, well-educated,
usually lives in Manhattan, has a successful career, and on the
surface seems independent and self-confident, yet I encounter
124

Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 558.
Society typically views battered women as helpless, which puts them at a
disadvantage in the legal system. Id. In an effort to minimize society’s impact
on the judicial system, expert testimony on battering was developed to explain
common experiences and their impact. Id. at 560. In addition “[t]he goal was
to assist the jury and the court in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of the
battered woman’s action. The notion of expert testimony was predicated on an
assumption that battered women’s voices would not be understood or were not
strong enough to be heard alone in the courtroom.” Id. By focusing on both
the particular and general aspects of battery, social beliefs of female
subordination are more easily recognized, and women are allowed to tell their
individual stories within a general context. Id. at 567-68.
125
See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 31 (recognizing
that because of various societal stereotypes against women who kill, they often
faced discrimination and inequality at trials); see also Meier, supra note 29, at
1344 (recognizing that society conveys messages to the victim that her
experience of domestic violence is trivial, or that her accusations are false, or
that she is personally responsible for the abuse).
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clients on virtually a daily basis who have been battered or are
now being battered.126
I have learned that abused clients will often only hint at the
violence or threats of violence they are experiencing, telling only
the surface of the underlying reality. They often have a depressed
affect, not showing much emotion even when telling me about a
traumatic event.127 Some women, including the client whose case
I will talk about in a moment, even laugh or tell jokes when
talking about abusive behavior. Sometimes that is another way to
downplay the seriousness of what they have experienced.
Sometimes humor is also how they survive it.
I’m going to call my client Jane. I’ve been working with her
for about a year. I conducted the initial consultation with a
partner in my office, Ellen Gesmer. What Jane came to talk to us
about was a scenario that Ms. Levinson just described when she
was speaking.128 Jane had purchased an apartment with her then
boyfriend, whom I will call Bill, and their relationship was
coming to an end. The apartment was a New York City
condominium that they had purchased for approximately thirtyfive thousand dollars. In the real estate market at the time Jane
came to us, the apartment was worth approximately two million
126

For statistics on and profiles of domestic violence see generally
Domestic Violence Statistics, at http://www.actabuse.com/dvstats_3.html#3
(last visited Feb. 5, 2002). Midwestern State University conducted a study
based on a survey of 6,000 women. More than 50 percent of women who said
they had been abused reported family incomes above $35,000. Id. Just over 70
percent of the women were Anglo, 10.4 percent were black, and 9.5 percent
were Hispanic. Id. The women were also asked to provide information on
education levels and income of the abusers. That profile showed that more
than 18 percent had a bachelor’s degree or higher. Id.
127
This is also called “constriction.” See Meier, supra note 29, at 131214 (1993). See also Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the
Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 318-19 (1997) (stating that a
domestic violence victim suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) may recount stories of horrific violence inflicted upon her without
emotion). Moreover, “[w]ithout the proper training to recognize such a trait, a
benefits decision-maker may simply conclude that the battered (victim’s) story
is false” because they believe that true victims could never suffer such
violence without evoking emotion. Id. at 319.
128
See presentation of Betty Levinson, supra pp. 448-59.
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dollars. She wanted to know what her rights were with regard to
the property, and if it would be possible to sell the apartment and
recoup her investment in it even if Bill could not afford to buy
her out and did not want to sell.
When Jane initially came to us, she did not present her story
as being about, or even involving, domestic violence. She told us
that she and Bill owned the loft as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship, that they’d been in the relationship for about fifteen
years, and that they were never legally married. During their
relationship, she had made a major financial investment in the
apartment, paying for virtually all of the purchase and renovation
costs, maintenance, mortgage, insurance, and real estate taxes,
and had in addition loaned Bill money and paid half the rent on
his separate work space over the years.
She talked about him having broken a piece of furniture
during an argument, and then went on to tell the rest of the story.
We had to stop her there, because she talked about it as if that
were no big deal. In fact, I think she even laughed about it. We
had to ask her a number of questions to get the whole picture.
What eventually emerged was what I’ve come to recognize as
a fairly typical picture of an abusive relationship.129 It started
with a lot of isolation of her support systems—friends and
family—which then progressed to threats, then the breaking of
furniture or personal items or throwing and banging objects, then
throwing things at her, and finally physical assaults on her such
as grabbing her and shoving her against the walls. The threats
became more frequent and more intense as time went on. Jane’s
partner also drank and it seemed that his drinking was getting
worse. Jane knew that during a rageful episode, he was more
violent drunk than sober. So, while she was hesitant to tell us this
129

Of course, no two clients or instances of domestic violence are
identical. There are, however, elements that are considered common, typical
traits. See Women’s Issues and Social Empowerment, Domestic Violence
Information
Manual:
Forms
of
Domestic
Violence,
at
http://www.wise.infoxchange.net.au/dvim/dvabuse.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003) (describing the various types of domestic violence abuse such as
psychological, emotional, physical, and sexual abuses all of which undermines
the women’s confidence and isolate her from her support systems).
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at first, Jane was becoming concerned about her safety, and that
was really what had brought her to our office. She wanted to
know if she left the apartment, given the increasing danger to
her, would she in effect be giving up some or all of her financial
investment, or whether there were other options.
We next explored what her feelings were about the whole
situation. One of the things that I think can be very difficult in
working with people who have been abused and are still in the
process of freeing themselves from that abuse is that they often
don’t know, themselves, what it is they feel or what it is they
want, because they’re so used to not being allowed to say what
they feel or want.130
Other speakers today were talking about using patience. I
think one of the things that I’ve had to learn to be patient about is
that each person has his or her own process. As someone’s
attorney, I can’t advise my client and can’t take the next legal
step, whether that’s litigation, drafting a letter, or drafting a
contract, if I don’t know for sure that my client knows what he or
she wants.131 On the one hand, it is difficult to achieve a balance
between empowering a client by listening to her and respecting
her unique process versus confronting any denial she has and
encouraging her to assess her safety realistically.132
When we listened to Jane, what emerged was that her
130

Id. (citing Mary Ann Dutton, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among
Battered Women: Analysis of Legal Implications, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215,
219 (1994) (stating that “victims of domestic violence suffer psychological
effects, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or depression,” as well as low
self-esteem and nervousness as a result of being abused by a loved one)).
131
Lawyers have a general duty to clarify a client’s wishes before taking
further steps during the course of representations. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2002). A lawyer is required to “promptly consult
with and secure the client’s consent prior to taking action unless prior
discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the
lawyer to take.” Id.
132
See generally Meier, supra note 29, at 1345, 1347-49 (describing the
difficulty for a lawyer to adequately assess the danger their client may face
especially when some victims are unable to assess the danger for themselves as
a result of the severe abusive treatment they endured causing them to become
psychologically as well as physically dependent upon their abuser).
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complex feelings about her experience had a strong effect on her
ability to make a decision about what she should do.133 She
wanted to leave, but felt guilty because he had convinced her
and/or she had convinced herself that she was responsible for his
feelings. She also knew he would be unhappy about her leaving
and afraid of what his reaction might be, to what extent she was
safe, and what leaving might mean for her rights as to the
apartment.134
As soon as we realized that there was a continuing physical
and emotional danger for Jane in staying in her apartment with
her abuser, we had to address her safety first before we even got
to the legal issues regarding the apartment. That’s not something
that I think most of my professors taught me. It’s certainly not
something I learned in my contracts class, although I had a very
wonderful contracts professor. Nor was it something I expected
to deal with in what was essentially a real estate or contract case.
We had to talk with Jane about a safety plan.135 For example,
133

The psychological response suffered from domestic violence victims
exposed to prolonged abuse has been termed “learned helplessness.” See
generally Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Women Evidence in the
Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1991) (describing
learned helplessness as the effect of repeated beatings causing a battered
women to become passive and remain in an abusive situation).
134
An abused woman’s safety is very often intertwined with her legal
rights. See generally SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 5152, (citing Sally E. Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of Rights, in
IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 301-02 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns, ed., 1995) (stating that abusers are likely to become more violent
towards women who leave them and this threat to their safety and the safety of
their children are of great concern to victims)).
135
A client’s safety is, of course, of primary concern in situations of
domestic violence. See Meier, supra note 114, at 1349 (suggesting that if
danger is imminent, the lawyer should suggest to the client to seek shelter or
protection). Safe Horizon provides a guide to help abused women make a
safety plan. See Safe Horizon, Essential Information for Battered Women:
Making a Safety Plan, at http://www.dvsheltertour.org/safety.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003). The main guidelines and topics are: planning ahead;
deciding how you would get out; communicating with someone who can help
and deciding where you should go; keeping important documents together in a
safe place; memorizing or keeping a list of important telephone numbers; and
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I suggested putting all of her important documents in one place so
that if she had to leave suddenly she’d be able to get out quickly.
I suggested she think of some people she could call on and stay
with if she needed to leave suddenly. We talked about what the
police response was likely to be if she called the police.136 We
spoke to her about other legal options, such as how to get an
order of protection, which for her would be difficult because she
was not married or related to her abuser nor did they have a child
in common.137 This meant that she would need to go to criminal
court for the order, which, as discussed earlier, can be
frightening to a lot of women.138 It’s a very different experience
to get an order of protection in family or supreme court than to
go to criminal court, where the abuser will have criminal charges
against him or her.139
Next, we had to talk about Jane’s options regarding the
apartment. One option was to try to go to court and seek
partition, which would mean asking the court to direct that the
keeping your children safe. Id.
136
See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Guidelines on Police Response
Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases, at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/
agguide/3dvpolrs.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (stating that some common
police procedures in domestic violence situations include escorting victims to
the family part of the superior court, providing the victim with support
hotlines, and other lifesaving guidance and assistance).
137
In New York, if the victim is not or has never been legally married to
the abuser, and does not have a child in common with her abuser, she must go
to criminal court for an order of protection. See Obtaining and Enforcing
Valid Orders of Protection in New York State, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
nyw/victim_witness/pdf/OOPmanual.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (setting
forth the procedures for obtaining and enforcing orders of protection).
138
Once a domestic violence proceeding is within the jurisdiction of the
New York State Criminal Court, the prosecutor has control over the case, not
the victim, and the prosecutor may chose, but is not obligated, to take the
victim’s wishes into consideration. Id. at 18. Victims may hesitate to go to
criminal court because there is a greater threshold of evidence required for the
criminal court than in family court. Id.
139
Id. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 530.11(c) (McKinney 2003) (“The
purpose of Criminal Court is to prosecute the perpetrator for violating a law in
New York State and can result in a criminal conviction, incarceration,
probation and/or a criminal fine.”).
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apartment literally be divided in half, so that she could do what
she wants with her half and he could do what he wants with his.
That, of course, would raise issues of whether it was physically
possible to divide the apartment and what that would do to the
value of the property. We decided that partition wasn’t a good
option for her. We also had to research whether, if she left,
would it affect her right to seek partition. Our research indicated
that she could leave and it would not affect her rights140—but
there was still a concern about what he might do to the apartment
if she left, and how that might affect its value. However, in
researching partition, I came across one case, Johnston v.
Martin, which I was surprised to find.141 In that case, a couple
owned real estate together.142 The man had abused the woman for
a long time resulting in her leaving the property.143 A few weeks
after she left, he changed the locks.144 The court found that the
combination of the abuse with the changed locks constituted
ouster, which meant that she had the right to use and occupy the
property and since her abuser had deprived her of this right, she
could obtain the reasonable value from him for his exclusive use
of the residence.145 I don’t know if the court would have found
ouster if he hadn’t changed the locks, but the opinion makes it
clear that the man’s violence toward her was a factor in the
court’s determination.146
140

See Perkins v. Volpe, 146 A.D.2d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(holding that the defendant’s exclusive occupancy of a residence did not
constitute ouster because, as tenants in common, the defendant had the right to
occupy the whole residence).
141
183 A.D.2d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
142
Id. at 1019-20.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 1021.
146
Id. at 1019, 1021. The court stated:
[b]ased on the uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff moved out in
response to her troubled relationship with defendant and his violence
toward her and that defendant thereafter changed the locks on the
doors of the big house and informed her of this fact, we are
persuaded that defendant effectively denied plaintiff access to the
property.
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We discussed her offering to buy him out, but she could not
afford to do so, so this was not a viable option. We discussed the
possibility of his agreeing that he would buy her out. However,
every time she had brought either of those options up with him in
the past, he would become enraged. That was frightening to her.
In addition, there was a concern that he might file for
bankruptcy, in which case the apartment would be completely
lost to her, as the homestead exemption is so low in New
York.147 So that was not a viable option.
Another option we discussed with Jane was to go to court and
ask the court to force a sale. However, the legal standard to
obtain this relief is “great prejudice.”148 While I thought we
might be able to argue that it was unsafe for her to remain there,
and that he could not afford to buy her out, when I did the
research I could find no cases where a court had found that abuse
constituted great prejudice.
Finally, we discussed with Jane the option of negotiating with
him to agree to sell the apartment to a third party, and then
divide the profits in such a way that she could recoup her
investment. Ultimately, we advised her and she agreed that she
should move out of the apartment as soon as possible and then
begin the process of negotiating an agreement to sell and divide
the profits, or, if he wouldn’t agree, to take him to court to seek
partition or a sale.
Id. at 1019, 1021.
147
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2003) (exempting a principal
homestead up to “ten thousand dollars in above liens and encumbrances . . .
from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment”). New York’s
homestead exemption will only protect ten thousand dollars of the value of the
home above liens and encumbrances. Id. If there is any unencumbered value
left in the property after the value of the liens, encumbrances, and the
exemption are accounted for, the home will probably be sold to pay off the
husband’s unsecured debts.
148
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 901(1) (2003). The statute provides:
[a] person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or
tenant in common, in which he has an estate of inheritance, or for
life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the
property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made
without great prejudice to the owners.
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Then over the next several months, a routine began where
weeks would go by where I wouldn’t hear from her and I was
sort of flummoxed. I didn’t know what to do. The partner who
was supervising me encouraged me and validated for me that it’s
really my ethical duty to check in with her and make sure she’s
okay.149 Not only is it a nice thing but it’s really part of my duty
as her attorney.
For several months I had to keep checking in with her to see
if she was okay and to give her some encouragement. It took her
a long time before she went through her process and was really
ready to move out and to feel more empowered and more selfconfident. Ultimately, Jane was able to get him to agree that they
would sell the apartment.
I have been drafting an agreement setting forth when and how
they will agree on a sale price, accept an offer, and how they will
divide profits and expenses at closing. In doing that, even though
my client is much more self-confident than she was when she
first came to us, I have to be conscious of the power imbalance
that is there and her tendency to either let her fears direct her
decisions or to let herself believe that there is no abuse going
on.150
In some cases where the parties to a contract have been in a
relationship that was abusive, it may be impossible to form and
execute a viable contract where the power imbalance is too
great.151 These situations raise interesting issues regarding
149

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (2002).
(“[a] lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”).
See also Jo Ann Merica, The Lawyer’s Basic Guide to Domestic Violence, 62
TEX. B.J. 915, 916 (1999) (stating that “[l]awyers have an ethical and moral
obligation to inquire about the existence of domestic violence in criminal,
family, and tort cases, among others.”).
150
This general tendency has been noted elsewhere See Bruce J. Winick,
Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L.
REV. 33, 69 (2000) (stating that “[m]any domestic violence clients will be in
denial about their conduct or its wrongfulness, or will tend to rationalize or
minimize it. Attorneys need to be aware of how to deal with these
psychological defense mechanisms and how to engage in these highly sensitive
conversations with the client.”).
151
See also Marcia M. Maddox, Undoing the Unconscionable: Breaking
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contract formation, such as whether a battered woman can ever
be considered an “incompetent,” whether a true meeting of the
minds has occurred, and whether there has been duress. Because
of the extent to which Jane had extricated herself from the abuse,
these were not issues in this case, although there were times
earlier on in our working relationship when I considered them to
be potential issues.
As in a divorce agreement, I wanted to take steps to involve
as little need for direct communication as possible and resolve
many of the foreseeable problems and to minimize the potential
for confrontation and conflict. I made the contract self-executing
to the extent possible. I made the definitions section of the
agreement as complete and clear as I could. I also tried to build
in real easily identifiable consequences for Bill in the event that
he defaulted on his obligations under the contract. For example,
if he failed to move out of the apartment at the agreed upon time
and the closing was delayed as a result; he was solely responsible
for any associated costs, including legal fees. To some degree, all
of these are things I would want to do in any contract, but in this
case the stakes were much higher.
Professor Jennifer Rosato
I know we are running out of time, but I hope you’ll hang in.
There’s still more to say. I try to do whatever I can, in whatever
courses I have, to think about many of the social issues that are
raised. Domestic violence is just one of them. And I’m not really
looking in a course like family law to students like Kristin, who
are very, very aware of these issues, who are knowledgeable
already when they come to my class, but there are a lot of
students in my family law class—I teach about 60 or 70 students
each year—who either have experiences that are relevant, but
they’re there mostly because it’s a bar course, not because they
Unlawful Separation “Agreements,” 2 ATLA-CLE 2097 (2001) (addressing
marital agreements arising from domestic violence situations and highlighting
that evidence of domestic violence indicates that the parties to the contract do
not have equal bargaining power and such agreements may be deemed
unconscionable).
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want to be enlightened. They want to hear, mostly, what are the
equitable distribution rules, what are the rules for custody in New
York. It seems almost a deviation for me to be doing domestic
violence work in the class.152
That brings me to a couple of concerns that I always have to
think about when I’m doing an issue like domestic violence in my
classroom. The first is what has been called the feminazi
problem.153 That’s a problem especially if you are a woman
professor and you’re raising these issues in your classroom. I
think you have to be very careful that it’s not considered part of
your agenda that you’re ramming down students’ throats.
Therefore, it has to be done very sensitively; it can’t be done
everyday. In some sense, you have to be more neutral than you
might in other situations, because you can’t let your thoughts
about domestic violence seep into the conversation. Because in
my mind, the reason why you raise domestic violence issues is
not just for the enlightenment and learning, but also for the
openness of the discussion that occurs. If you shut it down with
your own agenda, that important discussion will not take place.
Therefore, before you start, you have to presume that in your
class there are folks who have been victims, folks who have been
perpetrators, folks that have worked for DA’s (District Attorney)
offices, folks that have worked in the defense context as well.
With that in mind, I try to teach domestic violence issues using
role-plays. That’s very important to me, to get people out of

152

Cf. Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, New Approaches to Poverty Law,
Teaching and Practice: Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence:
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 348 (1995) (noting that
outside of the clinical context and feminist jurisprudence, few courses other
than family law cover domestic violence and even within family law most
casebooks devote relatively few pages to the subject).
153
See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experience at
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 52, 82 (1994) (describing
the law school experience of a woman who was called a man-hating “feminazi
dyke” for her assertiveness); Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders:
Global Restructuring and Women’s Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1, 69 n.335
(2001) (attributing the growing use of the term “feminazi” as an inappropriate
representation of anti-male feminism, to television and radio personalities).
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personalizing their answer with “I think this,” “I feel this.”154
Specifically, what I do in family law is to create a fairly
extensive role-play in which I give students roles as associates in
a law firm who have a client coming to visit them during the next
class. As for the role of the client, I do a little bit of casting
myself, usually a former student that I know has a sensitivity to
these issues, but also who is a very good actress.
One year I found that the portrayal was almost too real. The
actress who I had in the role of “Linda,” the victim, actually
broke down and cried. The class didn’t really know what to do.
There was a collective sense of cognitive dissonance for a
moment—“Was this real or was this pretend?” Afterwards, she
said to me, “I don’t know what came over me. I just got so into
the role that I forgot about what I was supposed to be doing.”
As a professor, you don’t want the role-play to be a bad
Lifetime movie, right? On the one hand you want to role-play,
you want to put people in a role, you want them to get interested
and outside of themselves. On the other hand, you don’t want to
make it so fake that it seems like we are just playing games.
Until I teach them the black-letter law, that balance is sometimes
154

The merits of role-playing and other alternative teaching methods have
been noted by other commentators, cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Case Studies
in Legal Ethics: Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to
Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000). (providing a review of
various approaches to case studies, narratives and role-playing as educational
tools in the legal classroom). See also Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age:
Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, 74
WASH. L. REV. 319 (1999). Weinstein examines interdisciplinary education as
a method to train lawyers to be “creative problem solvers” who can better
serve the needs of their clients. Id. at 319 Her article reviews a model used at
the San Diego Interdisciplinary Training Program in Child Abuse and Neglect
and advocates exposing law students to professionals or students from other
disciplines within a problem setting. Id. at 354-61. Weinstein posits:
[i]f we understand the developmental levels at which many of our
students enter school, we should make efforts to expose them to law
practice as early in their education as possible. An increase in roleplaying and a requirement of pro bono work beginning in the first
year of school would accelerate maturation from both sociocultural
and psychological perspectives.
Id. at 362.
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hard to achieve. Sometimes I try to do it by bringing in someone
from the outside so it’s not just me sitting in a chair with a wig.
“Oh, that’s so funny, Professor Rosato. You’re playing the
victim today.” I have done that from time to time, when I’ve
needed to. But having that stranger in the room changes the tone
of the room significantly.
As the role-play begins, I ask the experts in the class—three
designated students—to interview the client. Before class, I give
the actress background facts to review. I ask her to be
forthcoming with the facts, but not too forthcoming. I think it’s
interesting that even when I use the same scenario, every class
elicits a different set of facts. Because in this particular scenario
there is abuse going back five years. It’s not very often that the
class, in the limited amount of time they have, really sees that the
pattern of abuse comes up often very early in the couple’s
relationship.
During the class, we not only get the facts during the
interview, but also do some problem solving. We add in a little
bit of skill development. The role-play is a realistic one, even
though it is applied to a non-stereotypical situation: a young,
white, middle-class couple. I developed the hypothetical with a
clinical professor. By running the hypothetical past one of my
clinical colleagues, I was able to really develop the ideas and
make sure that they were going to work out in context. During
the role-play, I have the students go back and forth with this
actress, our victim/client. She talks about the issues that have
come up in her relationship with her abusive husband. I have
given the students the applicable laws beforehand so they can ask
meaningful questions to reveal the material facts.
The interview usually takes place on one class day. For the
next class, we come back and I ask, “What should we do about
Ms. Fairless, our client?” What I find most interesting is, first of
all, the discussion—like the interview—is different every time I
use this hypothetical. It’s amazing how that happens. Second, I
find that there are some people who speak who have never
spoken in class before and never will speak again. The subject
engages them at some level. I try to have an open discussion, so
it means that the students who are or have been police officers
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tell me what it’s like for a woman to get an order of protection
and explain the role of law enforcement. DA interns talk about
the prosecutor’s role in the system. In the end, the discussion has
a sensitizing effect if you do it right: the students become
teachers by showing each other where they have been and there’s
a non-judgmental aspect to it. However, I think it’s essential that
if you are an opinionated professor and you don’t think you can
stay neutral, don’t try this type of exercise in your class.155
Because it is going to fail and it’s going to fail very badly and
perhaps negatively affect the entire semester.
Eventually, we do talk about the law. First, we discuss the
meaning of stalking in context.156 We have the statute in front of
us,157 and we have an interesting debate about whether a husband
155

See generally Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School, supra note
154, at 814-16 (describing the practical mechanics of teaching with case
studies and role-playing and noting that the professor’s task is to place students
in roles and facilitate dialogue); Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the
Importance of Interdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, supra note 154, at
361 (noting that professors “are in the position to model questioning behavior”
and that, ideally, a professor’s questions “would truly be information
seeking”).
156
See also Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws
Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 529-30 (1993)
(analyzing case histories representing the typical stalking situation—the jealous
lover, the violent husband or the vengeful ex-husband).
157
A number of states have passed stalking legislation that could be used
as teaching tools; although specifics invariably differ, Utah’s legislation is
illustrative. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5 (2002). It provides that:
A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his
immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate
family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:

DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC

478

7/7/03 11:06 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

following his wife around in a grocery store everyday for a week
constitutes stalking. We deal with the legal aspects but also what
is the reality, and how the application of the law works in a
particular context.158 We also address more broadly whether the
use of legal remedies is even appropriate, and whether the use of
legal remedies can escalate violence.159 I’m sure that, in the real
world you say, “Okay, well, the best thing to do is to get that
protective order.”160 But how is this really going to play out in
this relationship? And we have a tendency as lawyers to get right
to the legal remedy, but it may be an entirely inappropriate thing
to do,161 and we talk about that dilemma. We don’t necessarily
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of
his immediate family.
Id.
158

See, e.g., H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405 (N.J. Super. 2003) (holding
that husband’s alleged video surveillance of wife’s bedroom could constitute
harassment and stalking as predicate offenses of domestic violence); Milillo v.
Milillo, 748 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Fam. Ct. 2002) (mother’s allegations of three
physical break-ins by father to her home, in which she lived alone with her
children, made out cognizable claim of stalking); People v. Kieronski, 542
N.W.2d 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there was sufficient evidence
to bind defendant on charge of aggravated stalking of his ex-wife; ex-wife
testified that defendant approached her at public places and stated “I’ll get
you, bitch!”).
159
See generally Catharine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (noting different studies that indicate the
failure of restraining orders to adequately protect women from further abuse).
The article also surveys civil protection order statutes and state appellate
opinions and examines recent developments, trends and innovations. Id. at
813.
160
The protective order is the primary method to deal with domestic
violence in the United States. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order
Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 339, 348 (1995)
[hereinafter Barry, Protective Order Enforcement] (discussing the role of
protective orders in responding to domestic violence issues).
161
It has been noted that many attorneys do not understand domestic
violence and its effect on the survivors. See Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for
Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
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reach a solution, but we talk about it.
We also consider the lawyer’s role as counselor, as Kristin
just raised so beautifully so I don’t really need to say more about
it.162 But what we raise, for example, is what kind of counseling
a lawyer should do.163 As a teacher, I take a fairly passive role in
this discussion. I don’t say “in my experience.” Instead, I ask,
“What is our role here?” since many students want to send our
client to a mental health professional because they think she is
being too weak. Some say: “What’s wrong with her? Why can’t
she stand up to her husband?” Others are saying, “That’s not our
role. Our role is not to be counselors.” Therefore, there’s a back
and forth about what the appropriate role of a lawyer is.164
Often, we also have a child in the picture. So it’s also
important for the class to think about the legal ramifications not
LAW. 335, 338 (1994). (observing that rather than attempting to understand
the psychological impact on survivors, attorneys generally seek legal
remedies.) The survivor’s lack of resolve in prosecuting the batterer with
criminal charges of abuse leads most attorneys to seek civil protective orders.
See Barry, Protective Order Enforcement, supra note 160, at 345. Although
civil protective orders may be a popular remedy, they are not sufficiently
enforced to make them as effective as possible. Id. at 348. Protective orders
also do little in the way of reforming or punishing batterers because they only
remove the batterer from his victim. Id. at 346.
162
See presentation of Kristin Bebelaar, supra pp. 460-73. See also
Robert L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191-3 (1995) (noting that, to be an effective
counselor, attorneys representing battered clients should first acknowledge
domestic violence as both a psychological and legal problem and rather than
exclusively addressing the legal aspects of a situation).
163
See generally id. at 194 (articulating the legal counseling a lawyer
should provide and noting that “family lawyers handling domestic violence
cases must ensure that their clients receive appropriate treatment for their
emotional and psychological issues by psychotherapists or counselors properly
trained to handle domestic violence cases.”).
164
The issue of a lawyer’s role in domestic violence cases and counseling
has been explored extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, On
Integrating Responses To Domestic Violence: Teaching Ethical, Holistic Client
Representation in Family ADR, 47 LOY. L. REV. 163 (2001) (commenting that
a family law attorney addressing divorce or custody has the dual role of
identifying whether domestic violence is a factor and an ethical obligation to
protect the client from receiving or inflicting additional harm).
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only for the partners involved, but also for third parties.165 That
also shapes what we do.
I also try to bring in some of the non-legal aspects of it. We
talk about whether Linda should stay with her mother, who’s a
controlling person and tells Linda, “You stay with the man. He’s
a good man. He brings home the bacon. He takes care of the
child.” So her mom is telling Linda to stay, and that’s not maybe
what she wants to do. But what’s the alternative? What’s a
battered women’s shelter like?
Some students in the class with experience in domestic
violence matters educate the others and I think it’s very important
to have that dialogue and look at the legal and non-legal
aspects.166 The students not only think about what’s going to keep
her safe, first and foremost, but also what is going to keep her
the happiest in the long run and to pursue legal remedies if and
when she needs them.
None of the things I posed as part of the hypothetical, and
this also goes to what you were saying about real life dilemmas.
What if the client says, “Thank you very much but I don’t think
165

Addressing domestic violence in homes where children are present
requires consideration of additional legal and parental matters. See, e.g., In re
Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that domestic
violence by a child’s father against the mother witnessed by the child was
sufficient to constitute neglect because it placed the child in imminent danger
of mental impairment); In re Bryan L., 565 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Fam. Ct. 1991)
(concerning an allegation that a man beat his wife in the presence of their child
and that this behavior exposed the child to the risk of emotional and mental
impairment); E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (mandating
the consideration of the impact of domestic violence on the child in a custody
and visitation proceeding). See also Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims:
Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children Through
Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757, 769 (1996)
(noting that trial courts have terminated a father’s parental rights for
committing acts of domestic violence against the mother in the child’s
presence).
166
Other commentators have explored this dichotomy. See generally
Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women—What Works?, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 1171, 1178-82 (1995) (stating that one non-legal aspect of domestic
violence is what to do with victims who are seeking to get away from their
abuser).
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I’m going to need your services anymore.” What do you do as a
lawyer? In that scenario, is my duty as a lawyer to follow up or
to simply hope that nothing happens to her?167
I think all of these legal, non-legal, and emotional issues are
very important issues to raise in law school. I admit that
sometimes I do it on the cheap, and I apologize if I do, but I
think any well-intentioned attempts are worth it.168 That’s what
I’ve always thought.
Patricia Fersch
I might be able to help with some real life examples. I have a
low-fee law office and I represent both men and women. I jotted
down some names of some actual cases that I’ve worked on with
varying results that I thought would be helpful. I will use their
real first names because it just makes it easier for me to
somewhat tell their stories.
I will say that my concerns as a practitioner are always, and I
think I have them in the right order: safety first, hers and the
children’s safety; secondly, support. Again, in the right order—
emotional and financial. Strangely, the last concern is the legal
167

As a general rule, the lawyer’s duty to his or her client is a product of
an established lawyer-client relationship and no duty extends to individuals
who decline legal representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
(Scope [3]) (2002) (“Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer
relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal
services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.”). But see generally Christine A.
Picker, The Intersection of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical
Considerations and Tort Issues for Attorneys Who Represent Battered Women
with Abused Children, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 69 (1993) (exploring
the potential expansion of a lawyer’s duties in the context of domestic
violence).
168
See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional
Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259
(1999) (articulating reasons for and ways to cultivate law students’ emotional
intelligence in order to better represent clients in emotionally charged cases);
Shalleck, supra note 57, at 1022 (asserting that law schools should take an
active role in counteracting pervasive stereotyping of battered women to
transform the legal community’s understanding and representation of such
clients).

DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC

482

7/7/03 11:06 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

issues.169 But let me get to some of the stories.
First of all, to answer the last question that the professor
posed, “What if the client stops your services?”170 That is a real
problem, but there’s really not a thing, frankly, that I can do
about it. So I’ll start with the case of Lillian.
Lillian is very well educated and married to an attorney who
at one time worked for the District Attorney’s office in the
Domestic Violence Unit in one of the five boroughs. By the time
Lillian came to my office she already had a criminal order of
protection, evidence of very apparent physical abuse and a child
that was about a month or two months old at the time. The issue
for her initially was her apartment. She was in the apartment. He
was out—he had been ordered out by the criminal court. But she
was in his apartment and of course the child was his child. Lillian
was unsure about what to do; whether she should go to Albany—
her family was from the Albany area—whether she should stay in
the county she was in and whether he would fight her in terms of
issues of relocation because he was, of course, a lawyer. I won’t
get into the relocation issues, but you can certainly address that
with your family law professors.
As a result, Lillian was very unsteady. My role initially was
to encourage her to make or take some steps, such as seek
counseling. Finances weren’t a problem for her because she had
a certain amount of cash that she had accumulated prior to the
marriage. But it was going to be a problem because he was no
longer in the District Attorney’s office. Her husband was now a
private practitioner who took all his fees in cash and had not filed
taxes for about ten years, which was a wedge to use against him
if I got him into court. But the key was to get him into court.
Lillian, however, did not want to go into court.171 I started the
169

This prioritization has been advocated elsewhere. See, e.g., V. Pualani
Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who’s Listening? Introducing Students to ClientCentered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a
Clinical Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 93-94 (2002) (defining the clientoriented approach as one that seeks to give primacy to the overall well-being
of the client while de-emphasizing the legal concerns).
170
See presentation of Professor Jennifer Rosato, supra pp. 473-81.
171
In fact, many domestic violence victims are hesitant to pursue legal
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action and she dropped the ball. The case was before one of the
most respected judges of the New York County Supreme Court,
and I made the court aware of my problem with the client. I
adjourned the case a couple of times, but unfortunately, Lillian
dropped the action and never appeared.
She returned to my office a year later after sending me a
Christmas card with the baby’s picture. Lillian wanted to re-start
the action. We started it again, and again she stopped it, saying
that they were going to work things out. To my knowledge, in
the last year, thankfully, she was not physically battered again.
But that’s one example.
Another case was that of Robin. She was a vice president for
one of the banks, an absolutely beautiful, stunning, intelligent
African-American woman, married to an African-American man.
They had two boys, eight and ten years old. The husband was, I
don’t mean to be crude, but he was really a low-life.
Here there was no physical evidence of the abuse, whereas in
the first case I had physical evidence, and that client had an order
of protection.172 In this case there was no physical evidence of
abuse, no police record, and no order of protection. Robin had
never called the police or sought an order of protection. The
violence had escalated, but I had no evidence. However, I
absolutely, unequivocally and without a doubt believed my client.
There wasn’t a question in my mind. The problem here was her
safety and the safety of the two kids, with the abusive husband in
the house and no record to get him out.
The judge in this case, while refusing to order the husband
action against their abusers for various reasons. See, e.g., Meier, supra note
29, at 1345 (listing various reasons why victims are hesitant to turn to the
courts for help such as the fear of retaliation, fear of facing their abusers in
the courtroom, or believing that the presence of danger is insufficient to
warrant legal action).
172
The trend in domestic violence physical assault cases is for the
suppression of evidence of the abuse. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 51 (2000).
According to definitive government statistics on violence against women, only
41.5 percent of female victims of physical assault by intimates showed
physical injury. Id.
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out, held a tight rein on the situation. The judge was concerned
that getting him out would put Robin in worse harm. So the judge
kept him appearing in court literally every single day until there
was a resolution—and some of you may not like the solution. I
can’t say that I was really happy about it either but she was safe,
the kids were safe and, ultimately, we got the husband out. This
case is about three years old and I spoke to Robin recently. She
thanked me and so I guess all’s well that ends well. The bottom
line was that the judge helped me realize that if we give this guy
some money we’d get rid of him. This was exactly what we did—
we gave him some money and he went away. He’s been away for
three years. He chooses not to see his kids. He doesn’t bother her
and she’s happy as can be.
I admit that it was not the legal solution that I originally set
out to get, which was, so I can be clear, a divorce, an order of
protection ordering him out and for my client to get to keep all
the money because he was a bum and made no contribution to the
marriage or the kids. It was certainly a solution that has worked
for Robin and those kids in terms of their safety. Furthermore,
the amount of money in the scheme of things—which was about
fifteen or twenty-five thousand dollars—was a rather minimal
amount of money in this situation. However, relative to the other
families I usually work with, offering such a sum would be
impossible for most to bear. But in this case it was possible, and
it worked.
It appears that I am out of time. So, I guess the one thing I
wanted to say, and I’ll end with this, is that the most difficult
thing that I’ve found is many of the people who really are in
trouble in terms of domestic violence don’t say it.173 Many
victims remain silent. However, I often find people coming into
173

There are numerous reasons why battered women would remain silent
about their abuse. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, Victim Issues, Minnesota Center
Against Violence and Abuse, at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/victimi.
htm. (last visited Feb. 27, 2003). They may fear retaliation and heightened
abuse from their abusers; fear that they will be blamed for the violence
perpetrated against them; believe that reporting the abuse would be futile; be
without resources to engage in a prolonged legal battle; or may believe that
they can best protect themselves and their children by remaining silent. Id.
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my office saying, “I’m a victim of domestic violence.” Those
people are usually the ones whose marriage is unraveling.174 It
may not be pretty. What’s going on in their household may not
be anything that anyone wants to live through. But it’s a marriage
or a relationship unraveling, which is very, very different from
domestic violence.175
The other question is that—I don’t know if anybody talked
about it, and I’m obviously not going to get time to—when
domestic violence is used as a weapon especially with regard to
custody and visitation issues.176 But I guess we’ll save that for
another day. Thanks for your time.
Professor Elizabeth Schneider
Thanks to all of our panelists for these great presentations.
There are people in the audience who have done work in the area
or are teaching about domestic violence in other law schools that
I’d like to recognize.
174

See, e.g., William G. Austin, Partner Violence and Risk Assessment in
Child Custody Evaluations, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 483, 491 (2001) (asserting that
“clinical [studies] are likely to contain a higher level of psychological
disturbance and more entrenched family conflict (e.g., couples involved in
marital therapy), where biased reporting might be expected”); Andre Derdeyn
& Elizabeth Scott, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 493
(1984) (stating that “spouses in a deteriorating relationship may become
intensely competitive in an effort to protect themselves from distress caused by
the partner and to blame the spouse for the failing relationship”).
175
Cf. William G. Austin, Assessing Credibility in Allegations of Marital
Violence in the High-Conflict Child Custody Case, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 462, 466 (2000) (discussing “issues of reliability and validity in the
measurement of [alleged marital violence] in the child custody evaluation,”
and proposing a six-part test to evaluate the plausibility of domestic violence
allegations).
176
See id. at 491 (stating that “[a]lthough violence reporting may be more
reliable than previously thought, this does not imply that there will not be selfinterested distortions of violence reports for the complex child custody case
involving domestic violence. When the case cannot be mediated or settled and
a [child custody evaluation] is ordered, it is expected that there will be a
highly contentious quality to the case, in which information manipulation will
be common.”).
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We have Vicki Lutz from the Pace Law School Battered
Women’s Justice Center, a law school program devoted to
student representation of battered women, and Vanessa Merton
also from Pace Law School, who teaches in the area of health
law as well as other issues that touch on domestic violence. We
have Kim Susser, Director of the Domestic Violence Initiative at
the New York Legal Assistance Group (NYLAG), who coteaches a course on domestic violence and the law at St. John’s
University Law School. Nancy Erickson, who was already
mentioned, has done pioneering work and legal scholarship in
this area, first as a law professor at Ohio State and now in private
practice here in New York. Minna Kotkin established a Violence
Against Women Act Project several years ago in the Federal
Litigation Clinic that she directs here at Brooklyn Law School.
This was a very innovative and important project—counseling,
doing outreach, and educating women about their rights under the
civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, until it
was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Morrison.177 Finally a person is with us today
who will be coming into the fold, Deborah Tuerkheimer, now
with the Brooklyn DA’s office. Deborah will be joining the
faculty at the University of Maine Law School in Fall 2002 and
teaching a course there on domestic violence. I would like to
acknowledge one other person in the audience, Hedda Nussbaum.
In addition to the criminal case here in New York that I’m sure
many of you are aware of involving Hedda, she was the plaintiff
in Nussbaum v. Steinberg that Betty litigated successfully in
Manhattan Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, First
Department.178 Kristin and I wrote an amicus curiae brief in that
177

529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Supreme Court found that the Commerce
Clause did not grant Congressional authority to regulate “noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce” and that VAWA was also unconstitutional under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 617.
178
618 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App.
Div. 2000). Hedda Nussbaum, battered companion of Joel Steinberg, who was
convicted of killing their illegally adopted 6-year-old daughter, proved that
years of his abuse rendered her so incapacitated that the statute of limitations
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case and helped to organize law professors around the country on
these issues. Now let’s hear questions, comments and reactions
from members of the audience.
Nancy Erickson
Are there any movements in the statute of limitations area?
Anything happening there?
Betty Levinson
There are, but they’re limited. Let me start with New York,
which I know best. Both the toll for infancy and insanity are in
the same section of the CPLR.179 In either event, the toll of the
statute of limitations extends for ten years past the date of the tort
for which there would ordinarily be a one-year statute. 180
on her claims against him for assault and other intentional torts was tolled.
Ms. Nussbaum argued that the statute of limitations on her claims should be
stopped from expiring by section 208 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and
Rules, which extends the time to sue for persons under a disability due to
infancy or insanity. A referee agreed that Ms. Nussbaum had proven “an
overall inability to function in society,” the standard applied by the New York
Court of Appeals to the term insanity in the statute, and thus her civil suit
against Mr. Steinberg could go to trial. The Appellate Division, First
Department, affirmed the decision. See also Cerisse Anderson, Tolling of
Time-Bar Allows Nussbaum to Sue Steinberg, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1997, at 1.
179
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201 (McKinney 2003). “An action, including
one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, must be commenced
within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by
law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court shall
extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.” Id. See
also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 203 (McKinney 2003). “The time within which an
action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be
computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is
interposed.” Id.
180
Nussbaum, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 33. The appellate division held:
[t]he evidence adduced at the hearing and credited by the Special
Referee amply demonstrated that, during the 10-year period
preceding the commencement of this action, plaintiff was unable to
protect her legal rights because of an overall inability to function in
society, which tolled the one-year Statute of Limitations for
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The toll for insanity does not require proof of insanity as
understood in its colloquial use. As indicated in the leading case,
McCarthy v. Volkswagen, you need to show that the person
affected has been rendered incapable of functioning in society.181
In Hedda Nussbaum’s case,182 the special referee who tried the
summary judgment hearing on the toll explicitly held that an
inability to function can arise for economic reasons. This
suggests an expansion of the scope of “nonfunctioning” upon
which the toll can be based. Thus, if an abuser impedes his
victim’s access to their income and assets, and she is financially
dependent upon him, and has no funds with which to separate
herself and live her own life, let alone the freedom and funds to
retain counsel for the purpose of suing him, such can contribute
to the “nonfunctioning” justifying a toll. Expanding this
definition of “functioning” is definitely helpful.
Theories that have worked in other states either haven’t been
tried or haven’t succeeded in New York. In New Jersey, there is
good law based on continuing tort theory.183 In Idaho, a
intentional torts pursuant to CPLR § 208.
Id.
181

McCarthy v. Volkswagen, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1982)
(interpreting the toll for insanity to apply to “those individuals who are unable
to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in
society”).
182
Nussbaum, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 33. The appellate division held that “[t]he
evidence adduced at the hearing and credited by the Special Referee amply
demonstrated that, during the 10-year period preceding the commencement of
this action, plaintiff was unable to protect her legal rights because of an
overall inability to function in society, which tolled the one-year Statute of
Limitations for intentional torts pursuant to CPLR § 208.” Id.
183
See Giovine v. Giovine, 284 N.J. Super. 3, 18 (App. Div. 1995)
(holding that a plaintiff “shall be entitled to present proof that she has the
medically diagnosed condition of battered woman’s syndrome” and is “entitled
to sue her husband for damages attributable to his continuous tortuous conduct
resulting in her present psychological condition, provided [that] medical,
psychiatric, or psychological expert proof to establish[es] that she was caused
to have an inability to take any action at all to improve or alter the situation”);
Cusseaux v. Pickett, 279 N.J. Super. 335, 345 (App. Div. 1994) (“Because
the battered-woman’s syndrome is the result of a continuing pattern of abuse
and violent behavior that causes continuing damage, it must be treated in the
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defendant was estopped from asserting a defense of the statute of
limitations when his conduct was shown to be the reason the
plaintiff refrained from suing him.184 Estoppel was rejected in
New York in Hoffman v. Hoffman,185 where a young plaintiff
sued her father and grandfather for childhood sexual abuse. As
Judge Ciparick, who now sits on the New York Court of
Appeals, functionally said in the Hoffman case, “Legislature, do
something.”
Professor Elizabeth Schneider
I would like to underscore something that Tony said.186 There
is some very good scholarship now, Nancy, on torts and
domestic violence. First the Clare Dalton and Jenny Wriggins
articles that Tony mentioned.187 We have an entire chapter on
same way as a continuing tort”). See also David E. Poplar, Tolling the Statute
of Limitations for Battered Women After Giovine v. Giovine: Creating
Equitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 161,
186 (1996) (defining a continuous tort as “one inflicted over a period of time;
it involves wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted . . . . A continuing
tort sufficient to toll the statute of limitations is occasioned by continual
unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation,” and
discussing this doctrine in the context of battered woman’s syndrome).
184
Figueroa v. Merrick, 919 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that the defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations defense because his “statements or conduct induced the plaintiff to
refrain from prosecuting [the] action during the statutory limitation period.”).
185
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 1990). The
court held:
since the plaintiff reached her majority in 1961 and since she is now
over 40 years of age, the alleged conduct of the defendants is not
actionable unless the defendants are estopped from raising the Statute
of Limitations as a defense. As a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to
allege sufficient facts, as was her burden, to establish that the action
was brought within a reasonable time after the facts giving rise to the
estoppel had ceased to be operational.
Id.
186
See presentation of Professor J. Anthony Sebok, supra pp. 444-48.
187
Dalton, supra note 62, at 324 (exploring the ways in which abuserelated injuries fit or do not fit into traditional tort categories, discussing how
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torts in our casebook, which is in itself pretty amazing.188 You
couldn’t have had anything like that ten years ago.
So I think there’s a lot written. There are obviously the real
life problems that Tony and Betty were talking about, but there
are many interesting developments particularly on statute of
limitations efforts around the country.
Audience Member
Speaking about legislative changes, I know there are multiple
problems with women in non-traditional relationships. These
changes would make terms in the law more gender neutral and
broaden the definition of family relationships. I wonder if that
has really translated into access to legal remedies for nontraditional victims of domestic violence—men, people in samesex relationships, unmarried partners in family court arenas. I
wonder if anybody could speak to that.
Kristin Bebelaar
There’s a lot of movement in Albany on a bill to expand the
definition of family to include people who live together and are
not married among the current definition. This would expand
access to family court to those who are now unable to have that
access.189
issues of process make it difficult for victims of domestic violence to pursue
traditional claims, suggesting some substantive and procedural “fixes” for
these difficulties, and addressing the ways in which it is likely that a tort claim
by a victim of domestic abuse will be both triggered by, and complicated by, a
concurrent, or recently concluded, divorce proceeding); Wriggins, supra note
63, at 125 (asserting that as a consequence of the dearth of lawsuits in
domestic violence cases, key aims of the tort system such as deterrence and
loss-spreading are not achieved, and suggesting a more effective approach to
civil liability for domestic violence torts through insurance reforms such as the
Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan, which challenges the conventional
wisdom that intentional torts cannot or should not be insurable).
188
DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 806-67.
189
In the 2002-03 term, the State Assembly passed A2235, a bill that
expanded the definition of family in the Family Court Act and Criminal
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Patricia Fersch
The reality right now is that family court is not a vehicle for
same-sex couples who experience domestic violence, unless they
have another issue—unless they have a child in common.
Betty Levinson
There are ways around that, depending upon what remedy
you’re seeking, as long as you have a cause of action that could
go to supreme court. You can always ask for preliminary
injunctive relief, which can include an order of protection. In
fact, there are cases which I have used and recommended stating
that even if you can’t go to family court you can attach a TRO to
any claim.
Audience Member
Have any of you have seen any action around the gender
animus legislation in New York City and Westchester that allows
a tort action based on domestic violence over a six to seven year
period?190 Of course the problem is that you’ve got to show
Procedure Law to include “members of the same family or household.” This
would include “unrelated persons who continually or at regular intervals reside
in the same household or have done so in the past.” See State Assemb. A2235,
2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/
leg/?bn=02235 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
190
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 8-901-907 (2000),
the “Victims of Gender Motivated Violence Protection Act.” The statutory
language closely follows that of the federal Violence Against Women Act and
allows victims of gender-motivated violent acts to sue their attackers. See also
Julie Goldscheid & Risa Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias
Crimes—Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 265, 271 (2001) (examining state laws provide redress for gendermotivated violence). Recently, a plaintiff whose case against her former fiancé
for alleged gender-motivated abuse, brought under the federal Violence
Against Women Act, was dismissed because the applicable part of the Act was
struck down by the Supreme Court while her case was pending but was
allowed to be heard upon refilling in state court under New York City’s local

DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC

492

7/7/03 11:06 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

gender animus, but has anybody seen such activity?
Professor Elizabeth Schneider
I don’t know the answer to that. I’ve been wondering about
that, myself. After Morrison held the civil rights remedy of the
Violence Against Woman Act unconstitutional, New York City
passed legislation to create a local remedy.191
Now, the problem is that many cases involving the gender
animus requirement under the civil rights remedy of VAWA
never got to the merits because of the constitutionality problem.
My view always was that once they got past the constitutionality
hurdle, there were going to be big problems with the gender
animus requirement. My hunch was that rape looks like gender
animus to people, but domestic violence does not. That raises
questions that go to what Stacy Caplow discussed about unlinking
the issues.
That is ironic to me because the whole thrust of my argument
in Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking is to put domestic
violence back into a much more affirmative gender equality
framework.192 In one of the chapters in that book, written before
law. Local Law Applied Retroactively, 8 CITY L. 64 (2002). The court applied
the new law retroactively because the law’s intent was to supply a private
remedy to the victims of domestic violence and fill a void left by the Supreme
Court’s opinion. Id.
191
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 §§8-901-907 (2000). The
statute went into effect December 19, 2000, and was enacted because “in light
of the void left by the Supreme Court’s decision, the Council [found] that
victims of gender-motivated violence should have a private right of action
against their perpetrators under the Administrative Code.” Id. In its
Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent, the City Council further
described the gravity of the problems faced by victims of gender-motivated
violence within the court system and sought “to resolve the difficulty that
victims face in seeking court remedies by providing an officially sanctioned
and legitimate cause of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from
gender-motivated violence.” Id.
192
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 5-7.
Feminist legal arguments about gender violence have developed from
feminist insights about the way heterosexual intimate violence is part
of a larger system of coercive control and subordination; this system
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Morrison was decided, I discuss why I think courts are not going
to be very responsive around the gender animus arguments.193
Frankly, I think those points are still true, even under the New
York City formulation of it, even though it’s a different
formulation.
The point is—that judges still have to interpret the meaning.
If a batterer beats a woman and says, “I hate women as a class,”
then judges more are likely to see gender animus. If he’s just
beating her, judges will ask, why does that show gender animus?
That’s a particular problem of consciousness and sensitivity—an
enormous hurdle. That means that lawyers have to explain the
systemic, individual and social dimensions of battering, which is
very much the framework of our casebook. This is a tremendous
educational challenge for judges, for lawyers, for law students,
for law professors—for all of us—to put these pieces together and
understand battering within this larger social context.
Thank you all for a very stimulating and informative
program.

is based on structural gender inequality and has political roots. The
source of insight about the connection between lived personal
experience and structural power relations was the notion that “the
personal is political.”. . . In the process of lawmaking, feminist ideas
about the relationship between violence and gender have been
simultaneously transformed, depoliticized, subverted, and contained:
the broader link between violence and gender inequality that animated
them, has, to a large degree, been lost, or at least undermined.
Id.
193

Id. at 188-96. (suggesting that the same social attitudes that have
emerged and shaped the law in other domestic violence contexts—private,
personal or family issues—are likely to prevent intimate violence from being
understood or interpreted by judges as an issue of gender).

